

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1350715-0

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 09-03-2010

DIRECTOR, FBI

April 19, 1952.

SAC, WFO

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SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING
CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
INFORMATION CONCERNING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]
[redacted] has confidentially advised that he has been informed by a reliable source that [redacted]

In this connection, [redacted] related that about three months ago he received a phone call at his home which was answered by his wife. The caller asked for the [redacted] and when informed he was not at home, requested [redacted] to tell the [redacted] that [redacted] had called. When she inquired as to any telephone number that the [redacted] should call, the caller stated "just tell him [redacted] called and he will know where to get me."

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[redacted] He said his informant told him that through the telephone tap on his home, the details of a conversation regarding [redacted] had been obtained.

[redacted] During the course of his testimony in executive session before the Sub-Committee, [redacted] went into great detail in questioning him concerning [redacted]

[redacted] said from these two episodes, he feels the information could have been obtained only through tapping his telephone. He said he then conferred with two officials of the telephone company and after they had allegedly made a check of his home telephone line, informed him there was no tap on his phone. One official told him

TJJ:VE.

SE 44

162-9720-1
NOT RECORDED
71 JUN 4 1952

PL 47

FINAL FILE

Director

SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE RE CRIME, D. C.

April 19, 1952

there were only three places where his phone could be tanned at during the course of the conversation let slip that the phone had been tapped at one of these places but immediately corrected himself saying that it could have been. [redacted] stated the original information from his informant was that the taps were put on at the telephone board and after he had complained to the telephone company, the taps were removed and replaced on a pole near his home, an automobile being used as a receiving point. His informant even furnished him the number of the telephone pole from which the tap was operating. [redacted] said he had had an inquiry made by some of his men in the neighborhood of his home to determine if possible whether such a tap had been installed, with negative results.

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[redacted] said he contemplated going to Senator MATTHEW NEELY, Chairman of the Sub-Committee, and informing him of this matter but that he desired proof before he approached him. He said he knows from past experience that Senator NEELY is strongly opposed to wire-tapping and for that reason believes the activities by [redacted] are without the knowledge of the Senator. He said that as he looks back and recalls the various conversations he has had with [redacted] [redacted] has continually stated that wire tapping should be legalized in the District of Columbia and be handled under the same conditions that prevail in New York City. He further stated it is his understanding that [redacted] has imported two men from New York City who are familiar with wire tapping and has had them working for him since February 1, 1952.

[redacted] also stated he knows that former [redacted] [redacted] has worked very closely with the Sub-Committee and furnished them with information and leads and has, as a matter of fact, interviewed people with [redacted] on matters concerning the police department. He has received information from what he considers a reliable source that in February, 1952, [redacted] [redacted] by the name of [redacted] who is a close friend of [redacted] [redacted] had told the [redacted] informant that about April 1, 1952, there would be a big blow-off concerning the Metropolitan Police Department which would ultimately sweep [redacted] out of office, that [redacted] would become [redacted] and that [redacted] would take over all the gambling in the District of Columbia and operate with a freehand. [redacted] said he believed [redacted] was apparently referring to the narcotics condition disclosed by the Sub-Committee in March, 1952. Since he has taken office, [redacted] has informed him openly that he is campaigning to obtain the position of Superintendent of Police in Washington.

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The foregoing is submitted for the information of the Bureau.

DIRECTOR'S NOTATION. . "Since it appears to be open season for wire tapping, I think regular checks should be made of home & office phones of all members of Ex-Conf. & Sac & a Sac of Wash. Field." H.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. G. A. Tolson *RTH*
FROM : R. T. Harbo

DATE: May 3, 1952

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY TELEPHONES OF
MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE
AND SAC AND ASAC, WFO

pt 9-1

PURPOSE

Check of telephone service

To report the results of the security survey on the home telephones of members of the Executives Conference and the SAC and ASAC in WFO. No taps were found.

DETAILS

Telephone Security Survey

Pursuant to the Director's instructions on the WFO memorandum captioned "Senate Sub-Committee Investigating Crime in the District of Columbia, Information Concerning," the residence telephones of the following were checked:

The Director
Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Mohr
Mr. GERRY

*Conf. May 52
Exe 5/8/52
fwd 5/8/52
fwd 5/14/52*
All central office appearances, working and multiple cable appearances and telephone instruments were examined and found free of clandestine connections.

The facilities serving Mr. Holloman were examined; however, subsequent to this examination the service has been changed from two party to private line. As soon as the prerequisite information required to complete this check is compiled by the telephone company, a complete security survey will be afforded this line. Information received from the telephone company on May 1, 1952, indicated that this data will be afforded on May 6, 1952.

It is evident from this survey that the telephone services of all officials except the Director, Mr. Rosen and Mr. Mohr can be tapped at points remote from their residences where their telephone pairs reappear, usually referred to as multiple appearances.

160 RECORDED - 15 162-9730
GRC: VPH 18 Reg. SE 44 JUN 3 1952
EX-25 13 *SEVEN C.G.T.*

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Hesse _____
Gandy _____

CHIPS FILES

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

May 3, 1952

The monthly check of the office telephones of the Bureau officials was made on April 8th in accordance with instructions contained in Mr. Conrad's memorandum to me dated January 23, 1952, captioned "Bureau Telephones Security Checks."

The technical data compiled during this survey will be retained in the Laboratory.

A letter has been directed to the Washington field division reporting completion of central office portion of the lines of SAC Hood and ASAC Fletcher together with information revealing the location of the working and multiple appearances of these lines.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Bureau consider requesting the telephone company make all lines nonmultiplying. It is suggested that this be handled by the Communication Section through commercial contacts in order that the engineering staff at the telephone company can issue orders for the desired work. This will involve much planning, extensive work and expense to the telephone company.

That the working and multiple appearances of the residence telephones of officials listed in this memorandum be checked once in each 90 days.

That the facilities in the telephone company central offices be checked once in 6 months and the instruments on the premises be checked once in each year.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

May 3, 1952

That times for these checks be staggered in such a way that no definite pattern can be established on a recheck of the facilities.

Best possible copy

Washington Field

May 1, 1952

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL - JULY~~

SECURITY OF TELEPHONE SERVICES

RECORDED - 16

EX-25

Confirming telephonic instructions given to A. G. L. B. Fletcher on April 25, 1952, regular security checks should be made of the home phones of the S.A. and C.I.D. of the Washington Field Office. These checks should be handled on a quarterly basis by qualified sound men assigned to your office. The quarterly check may be limited to the times between the telephones exchange and the residences, with a check of the instruments in the residences to be made once a year. Representatives of the Laboratory will handle semi-annual checks within the telephone exchanges involved.


You should, of course, continue to make the regular monthly security checks of office telephones required under existing Bureau instructions to all field offices.

Attached hereto is a statement containing technical data which will be of assistance to the sound men of your office in making the security checks of the residence phones of the S.A. and C.I.D.

Attachment

RTH:kmb

Deacon _____
Feld _____
Holloman _____
Ladd _____
Merritt _____
Oliver _____
Patterson _____
Ritter _____
Tamm _____
Ward _____
Wheeler _____
Wright _____



APR 19 1952

25 APR 01 AM
S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CORPORATE - JUNE~~

Best possible copy

Laboratory technicians have examined the central office facilities of telephones Decatur 2290 listed to Mr. E. Wood and or May 4481 listed to H. B. Fletcher. These facilities were found free of clandestine equipment.

The following information is supplied for assistance in making a check up to determine the ultimate capacities of the cable facilities:

Received 22 June 1979 from W. D. Ladd, University of Tennessee:

Leucostoma - *luteum* (L.) Benth. *var. luteum*. *Yellow* *Leucostoma*
Leucostoma - *luteum* (L.) Benth. *var. luteum*. *Yellow* *Leucostoma*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY
TELEPHONES OF MEMBERS OF
EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

DATE: May 7, 1952

✓ Tolson
✓ Ladd
✓ Clegg
✓ Mohr
✓ Holloman
✓ Rosen
✓ Tracy
✓ Harbo
Belmont
Kear
Tele. Room
Massey
Gandy

On May 6, 1952, the Conference, composed of Messrs. Ladd, Glavin, Mohr, Belmont, Rosen, Clegg, Gearty, Holloman and Harbo, was advised of the Director's instructions that regular checks should be made of the home and office telephones of all members of the Executives Conference and the SAC and ASAC of the Washington Field Office, and that the check had been completed with negative results.

Under a program previously approved by the Director, office telephones of members of the Conference are checked monthly. The Conference unanimously recommends that the residence phones of members of the Conference be checked on a quarterly basis. This will be limited to the lines between the telephone exchange and the individual residence, with a check inside the telephone exchange being made semiannually and an actual check of the telephone instrument in the residences of the Conference members being made only once a year. The schedule for the SAC and ASAC of the Washington Field Office would be the same as proposed herein for the Conference members. If the Director approves, the attached letter may go forward to the Washington Field Office.

✓
Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

Attachment

CC - Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

RTH:kmb

RECORDED 15
SE 44

EX-25

162-97304-3
18 JUN 2 1952FBI - WASH. D.C.
MURKIN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo *RTH*

DATE: May 28, 1952

FROM : I. W. Conrad *IWC*

SUBJECT: ~~SECURITY CHECK ON THE OFFICE PHONES OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT A. LOVETT AND
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM C. FOSTER~~

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Pm. _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

This is to advise that on May 26 and 27, 1952, [redacted] and [redacted] of the FBI Laboratory conducted a security survey on the office phones of Robert A. Lovett and William C. Foster. Only the [redacted] in Mr. Foster's office was included in the check as specified by [redacted] Security Officer of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

No evidence of any tampering on any lines was discovered. Furthermore it was determined that in the case of extension 86 of the White House Board National 1414 a multiple appearance at the Munitions Building had been removed and [redacted]

In view of the security precautions being taken by the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company in their exchanges, when this survey is conducted in the future a check will be made in the telephone exchanges themselves once every 6 months. The survey is conducted quarterly.

JMM:vrh *vrh*

⑤ SECURITY OF TELEPHONE SERVICES

RECORDED - 131
INDEXED - 131

62-97355-3X
CD-1710-114
165-87819
JUN 18 1952

84
MAY 22 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *RH*

FROM : I. W. Conrad *JWC*

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK BUREAU PHONES

DATE: October 21, 1952

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b7C

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Clavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

On 10-17-52 [redacted] and [redacted] of the Laboratory conducted a security survey on the residence phones of G. C. Gearty during which no evidence of tampering was observed. The following is the information which will be necessary to conduct the security check in the future:

Name

G. C. Gearty

Address

3246 Aberfoyle Place, N.W., Washington, D. C.

Phone Number

EMerson 2-3215 (old number OR 3215)

This number presently used until general change in all Washington numbers. Then the Emerson number will be correct.

Central Office Information

group 233
 terminal 33
 cable 523
 pair 3

Multiple Appearances

None

Working Appearances

C & P pole 2354H (rear 3246 Aberfoyle Place)
 lug 3

Instruments

One 302C in dining room (the Gearty's contemplate the installation of an extension phone in the future in the master bedroom upstairs)

Protector Block

Located in basement.

62-97308

RECORDED-140
INDEXED-140

162-97308-4

, OCT 24 1952

JMK:vrh

EX. - 10

CRS
JMK

7-RH

70 OCT 29 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *pp*

DATE: January 13, 1953

FROM : I. W. Conrad *of the Senate Service*

b6

SUBJECT:

b7C

SECURITY SURVEY OF OFFICE AND RESIDENCE
TELEPHONE LINES OF SENATOR PATRICK A. McCARRAN

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Gavin _____
Harbo
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. En. _____
Mease _____
Gandy _____

On 1-12-53 [redacted] and [redacted] conducted a security survey of the Senate Office Building and residence lines of Senator McCarran. No evidence of tampering was found.

At the residence, there are 3 instruments. In the library, a pair of wires about 18" long, terminating in a 2-hole Jones socket, is attached to the line at the instrument. This socket could be used as a convenient means of attaching a recording device to the phone. No recording equipment was observed.

JMM:vrh *initials*

62-97308 *initials*

*Mr. Conrad
Admireal
JMM*

SEARCHED-84
INDEXED-84

162-97308-5
JAN 13 1953
13

162 JAN 30 1953

RH

cc - Mr. Parsons

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

FROM : O. A. Ezell

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF THE OFFICES OF THE
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

DATE: March 10, 1953

JUNE

Security Surveys

Under date of 11-20-52, a suggestion was made, by the writer, that an examination of the offices of key Bureau officials and supervisors of the Domestic Intelligence Division be made to determine if resonant cavities or other listening devices may be present. At that time the necessary equipment to conduct such a check was not available.

This suggestion was made, in part, due to the fact that during the past several months various types of listening devices have been discovered secreted in the offices of the US diplomatic officials located in the Soviet Bloc. While no such devices have been found, to my knowledge, within the United States, it is felt that we cannot afford to adopt the position that the FBI is immune to such attempts at Soviet penetration, since, as the foremost intelligence agency of the Western powers, we are a logical Soviet intelligence target. The study of the resonant cavity device, the seriousness of which has just been discovered within the past six months, likewise prompted the suggestion at this time. The range of its effectiveness depends upon the power of the activating mechanism, which conceivably might be concealed in any of the private buildings fronting on Pennsylvania Avenue.

RECOMMENDATION:

Inasmuch as the Radio-Electrical Section is now in possession of the necessary equipment, it is recommended they be requested to conduct an examination of the offices of key Bureau officials and supervisors of the Domestic Intelligence Division to determine if resonant devices or other listening devices may be present.

5-17-53
Mervin & Harkins
3/18/53
J.W.C. m.h.
OAE:kcl

RECORDED - 5
EX-102 INDEXED - 5 . 62-97302-6

- Mr. Belmont

cc - Mr. Parsons

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *RH*

DATE: March 18, 1953

FROM : I. W. Conrad

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF BUREAU OFFICES
Security Surveys

June

Reference is made to memo from Supervisor O.A. Ezell to Mr. Branigan dated 3-10-53 renewing a recommendation that examination be made of the offices of key Bureau officials and supervisors of the Domestic Intelligence Division to determine if resonant cavity microphones or other listening devices may be present.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clagg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Nease _____
Candy _____

As indicated in my memo of 12-5-52 in response to the earlier recommendation we were equipped at that time to make the security search for everything except the cavity microphone, and search equipment for the cavity microphone was not purchased by the Bureau because of lack of funds. However, the Bureau subsequently has purchased one set of equipment for cavity microphone searches. As previously indicated the minimum searching party consists of 2 men and it is estimated that a minimum of 2 days time will be required to search a single room of average size for the cavity microphone alone. In addition, prior to beginning active search for the cavity type microphone, a "listening" type of search should be conducted for several hours in order to determine whether cavity microphones might be being activated by the enemy, it being noted that active search as distinguished from "listening" would immediately inform the enemy of our activities.

One additional day's time for 1 man is required to search a single room of average size for other types of microphones. Accordingly, it is estimated that a total of 6 man days will be required for the complete search of each average size room involved. Certain phases of the search for the cavity type microphone will necessarily have to be carried out during the hours in which the office is occupied and in use. This will mean that approximately 1 of the above 6 man days per room will involve a technician in the space to be searched during the normal working day.

As previously pointed out by me, the "room search" approach will not as a practical matter insure 100 per cent against the presence of microphones since it is entirely possible to conceal microphones in such a way that they cannot be detected with present day equipment, without substantial damage to wall surfaces, and, of course, the destruction of wall surfaces is not a practical approach.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the security checks which we are making for other government officials, I certainly agree that it is desirable to insure insofar as possible the security of our own critical offices. It is suggested that we start with a survey of the offices of the Director, Mr. Tolson, Mr. Ladd and Mr. Nichols.

IWC:vrh (1) 5/14/53 5/14/53
RECORDED - 9 62-97308-7
INDEXED - 9 APR 15 1953
EX-102 7-RJ

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
J U N E
FROM : Executives Conference
SUBJECT: SECURITY OF BUREAU OFFICES

DATE: March 30, 1953

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Winkenrow
Tele. Rm.
Gandy

Security Survey RH

On March 30 the Conference composed of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Callahan, Tracy, Clegg, Gearty, Holloman, Belmont, Mohr and Harbo considered the suggestion of Special Agent O. A. Ezell of the Domestic Intelligence Division that the Laboratory make an examination of the offices of key Bureau officials and supervisors of the Domestic Intelligence Division to determine whether resonant cavity microphones or any other listening devices may be present.

The Conference was advised that it would require 6 man days per room to make such a search, that it would not insure one hundred per cent against the presence of microphones since they could be concealed without detection unless substantial damage was done to wall surfaces.

The Bureau now has the equipment needed to search for the cavity type microphones. It is anticipated that a request to search for such devices will be received from the White House. The Conference was opposed to the suggestion of Mr. Ezell. Mr. Ladd was likewise opposed to a proposal that a search for listening devices be made only in the Director's Office on the ground that it is extremely unlikely that hidden listening devices would be found, due to the practical difficulties of gaining access to the space to install any concealed microphones.

Messrs. Tolson, Callahan, Tracy, Mohr, Belmont, Clegg, Gearty, Holloman and Harbo recommend that a search for cavity type microphones and other listening devices be made in the Director's Office. They recognize that it is unlikely any concealed listening devices will be discovered but feel that since we are making such searches for other agencies we should make such a search of the Director's Office as a precautionary measure.

Preliminary search
began 4/6/53. Holloman
will advise when
office again available.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

RECORDED - 8 INDEXED - 8 APR 15 1953

cc - Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

RTH:VH

b7D

STK

DJW

TMO

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

DATE: April 3, 1953

FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK*

WJ

SUBJECT: REQUEST OF POSTMASTER GENERAL SUMMERFIELD
FOR A MICROPHONE SECURITY CHECK OF HIS OFFICE

AB
PY
Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont *✓*
Clegg _____
Gavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Security Survey

On April 2, 1953, while [redacted] of the Liaison Section was discussing other matters with Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield, he stated that he was a little concerned about some of the leaks emanating from the Post Office Department. *JWS* b6 He stated that he understands that [redacted] had a man assigned b7C to each Cabinet officer for the purpose of picking up information from any source he could and that because of this, plus the fact that there have been leaks, he would feel safer if the FBI would have a check made of his entire office suite for the possibility of microphones being planted in the ordinary and most usual places. He stated he did not want the panels ripped off the wall but if we could make a check of electrical receptacles, etc., he would feel much better about it. Mr. Summerfield stated he would like to have, in addition to his immediate office, the office of Deputy Postmaster General Charles R. Hook, Jr., checked, plus the reception rooms used by Mr. Hook and himself.

Mr. Summerfield stated that this check could be done at the Bureau's convenience.

ACTION:

It is recommended that the Bureau make the requested security check of the Postmaster General's suite. If you approve, this memorandum should be forwarded to the Laboratory for handling.

WJ
OHB:lw
1 - Mr. Harbo

Baptist above
7pm 4-3-53
arrangements
for check

4-29-53
memo to Harbo
from: JWS
4-10-53

RECORDED
INDEXED

62-973-1-9

4-30-53
4-6-53
4-10-53

AB
CH

Office Memo *m* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *Re*
FROM : I. *W* Conrad

DATE: April 3, 1953

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE SECURITY CHECKS FOR
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Nease _____
Oandy _____

G.I.R. 9

Re my memo 2-10-53 advising that arrangements are being made with the telephone company to reassign the house pair in the Senate Office Building for the unlisted telephone line to a non-multiple pair. The telephone company advised on 3-31-53 that the reassignment had been completed; in addition, telephone extension 1149 also had its multiple removed. Accordingly, all of Mr. Nixon's telephones in the Senate Office Building are now supplied with house pairs which do not multiple at other locations.

ACTION

This information is being submitted for Mr. Nichols reference in further advising Vice President Nixon.

RFP:vrh

vehr *Re*
will handle

SECURITY

RECORDED-86 INDEXED-86

APR 7 1953 1853 130 PM '23

62-97308-984

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED
FBI - WASH. D. C.
E. B. I.
RECEIVED - NICHOLS

1 Re
APR 7 1953

7-182

222

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

DATE: April 7, 1953

FROM : V. P. Keay *VPA*

JUNE

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE BENSON
FOR A SECURITY CHECK

PC-9-1

NYC
RH
SO
La
Nichols
Beb
Cle
Gavin
Harbo
Rosen
Trav
Lauplin
McB
Wiercowl
Ielo, Rm.
Helleran
Gandy

Security Surveys

On April 2, 1953, while [redacted] of the Liaison Section was discussing other matters with Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, he advised that he was a little concerned with the security of the Department of Agriculture's "Report Room." Secretary Benson stated that in this room his people compile facts and figures concerning prices and other confidential information relating to the United States agricultural economy. He stated that at a given time he has to go to this room and sign the prepared report. Following this, copies of this report are furnished to newspapermen and other interested persons and the information then becomes public. Up to this point it is essential, according to Secretary Benson, that this information be kept strictly confidential.

Secretary Benson stated that if possible, he would appreciate the Bureau's making a security check of this room and look for concealed microphones in the most logical places. Secretary Benson stated that he would go into this matter more fully when the Bureau's representatives come to his office on Monday, April 6, 1953, to check his telephones in connection with the countermeasure device.

On April 6, 1953, Special Agent [redacted] of the Electrical Section of the FBI Laboratory checked the telephones of Secretary Benson in connection with the countermeasure device. At that time Secretary Benson was away from his desk; however, [redacted] talked to [redacted] Executive Assistant to the Secretary. [redacted] advised [redacted] that there were actually four rooms involved in the "Report Room" setup and that Secretary Benson desired the FBI to check these rooms for the purpose of preventing any possible leaks by the use of concealed microphones. [redacted] advised that he would contact the Bureau through Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section as to when the room would be available for checking.

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Bureau comply with Secretary Benson's request to make a security check of his "Report Room." If this is approved, [redacted] of the Liaison Section will make the necessary arrangements with Secretary Benson's office to have these rooms checked.

OHB:lu No word for broadhead or of i INDEXED - 79
5/1/53 fm m. bartlett RECORDED - 79
1 - Mr. Harbo to contact fm m 5/1/53 SE 46

62-97308 (See F-21-1)

5-12-53 Broadhead will advise when report room is available. OHHB

163-97308-10 APR 10 1953 LIAIS

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo
FROM : Mr. Conrad

DATE: April 10, 1953

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE SECURITY SURVEYS OF
OFFICE SUITE OF POSTMASTER GENERAL ARTHUR E. SUMMERFIELD

b6

b7C

J U N E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(M)

De Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Nichols ✓
Belmont ✓
Glavin ✓
Harbo ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Rx. ✓
Moore ✓
Gandy ✓

On 4/9/53, SA [] and [] checked [] and [] checked the offices of Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield, Deputy Postmaster General Charles R. Hook and Mr. Summerfield's [] for concealed microphones with negative results. The search was limited, at the request of Mr. Summerfield, to the most likely locations, such as lighting fixtures and receptacles, air conditioning and heating ducts and controls, baseboards and chair rails, decorative cornices, alcoves, and fireplaces. No damage was done to the walnut paneling.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Liaison Section advise the Postmaster General of the result of this survey.

JMM:np

PH

62-97308

WY

4-15-53 DEPUTY PM GEN'L CHAR. R. HOOK ADVISED.

QHD

F

RECORDED - 93 | 62-97308-11

APR 21

SAC

APR 21

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓
 FROM : R. T. Harbo *RTH*
 SUBJECT: HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Justice, State and Commerce Departments
Room B-25, Main Capitol Building
SECURITY SURVEYS

DATE: April 24, 1953

JUNEb6
b7C

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

Pursuant to the information relayed to the Laboratory by Mr. N. P. Callahan, SA [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] of the Laboratory made a security survey today of Room B-25, Main Capitol Building, Subcommittee on Appropriations, with negative results.

[redacted]
 [redacted] was present during the period of the survey. It consisted of an examination of the electrical outlets, telephones and walls for concealed microphones, radio transmitters, radio frequency microphone-telephones and tel-mike installations. The survey did not include a check for telephone taps outside of Room B-25.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the results of the survey be furnished to [redacted] of the Subcommittee, by Mr. Callahan.

CC - Mr. Callahan

RECORDED - 42
 INDEXED - 43 62-77308-12
 EX-102. : 12

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-40972-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: April 20, 1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

JUNE

SUBJECT: LOUIS L. STRAUSS,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
CONTERMEASURE DEVICE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Close _____
Slavik _____
Menzel _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Hance _____
953
Tom _____
Tele. 4002
Please _____
Andy _____

Reference your memorandum to the Director of March 27, 1953, wherein he approved the Bureau's making a security check of Strauss' office in the Executive Offices Building. The Laboratory will make this security check at 10 a.m. on April 21, 1953.

[redacted] called on April 20, 1953
and stated that Strauss had inquired of the White House about the countermeasure device for his telephone and had been referred to the Bureau. b6

b6
b7c

ACTION:

The countermeasure device will be placed on Strauss' phone at the time a security check is being made of his office unless advised to the contrary. SURVEYS

CWB:lw

1 - Mr. Harbo

162-97308-1
NOT RECORDED
146 MAY 12 1953

5120¹³

COLLECTORIAL FILE # 80-160-196

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HARBO *PB*

FROM : I. W. CONRAD *IWC*

SUBJECT: ~~HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS~~ JUNE
Justice, State and Commerce Departments
Room B-25, Main Capitol Building
~~SECURITY SURVEYS~~

DATE: April 24, 1953

Tolson _____
 E. A. _____
 DeLoach _____
 Glavin _____
 McGrath _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Sundt _____

SYNOPSIS

Security survey made of Room B-25, Main Capitol Building, Subcommittee on Appropriations, on 4/24/53, per instructions received from Inspector Callahan on 4/23/53. *gj* *negative*
 Results negative.

ACTION

Confirming the oral information furnished to you, the results of the survey were furnished telephonically to Inspector Callahan in order that he might appropriately advise [redacted] of the Committee.

b6
 b7C

DETAILS

Pursuant to instructions received on April 23, 1953, SA [redacted] and [redacted] reported to Inspector N. P. Callahan this morning who accompanied them to Room B-25, Main Capitol Building, where they were met by [redacted] Subcommittee on Appropriations, a former Bureau Special Agent.

RECORDED-77 62-97308-13

The extent of the survey was discussed with [redacted] who advised that the request for this survey was based on information furnished the Committee by the Inspector that a "special" microphone (cavity microphone) can be installed and activated without wires leading therefrom. It was pointed out to him that while a survey at this time would detect the presence of any concealed equipment, it would not reveal the source of the energy, which is most important in detecting the identity of the operators of such equipment. To be effective in determining the origin of the energy in this type of concealed microphone, the search should be conducted at a time when the "enemy" would be likely to be activating the cavity microphone, as for example when the Subcommittee is in session. Too, it was pointed out that if such a microphone is concealed in the room, the "enemy" may detect the presence of the searchers and abandon all operations for fear of being detected, thus voiding any possibility of detecting the source of energy. Nevertheless, [redacted] advised that as far as the Committee was concerned, he believed the survey for concealed equipment should proceed at this time. Accordingly, the

cc: Mr. Callahan

GKC/mek 62-97308

4-24-53
 3-8-53

3-8-53 7-108

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b6
b7C

survey was conducted by SA [redacted] and [redacted]. The results were negative.

The survey consisted of an examination of electrical outlets, telephones and walls for concealed microphones, radio transmitters, radio frequency microphone-telephones, and tel-mike installations with negative results. Two suspicious locations were detected which required penetration into the wall and door jamb. These penetrations were done with [redacted] approval and at his request. Further examination eliminated the possibility of their being used for concealed microphones.

The survey did not include a telephone security survey exterior to Room B-25 as none was requested.

[redacted] was with the searchers during the conduct of the entire survey and although no report was made to him, it is assumed that he was cognizant of the results by virtue of his Bureau experience. Care was taken that no comments were made which might be misinterpreted by [redacted] concerning the results of this survey.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *RH*

DATE: April 21, 1953

FROM : I. W. Conrad *JUN E*

SUBJECT: ADMIRAL LEWIS L. STRAUSS
 SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
 SECURITY SURVEYS AND
 COUNTERMEASURE DEVICE INSTALLATION

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Harbo	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Laughlin	_____
Mohr	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Re.	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Belmont to the Director dated 3-27-53 and memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Ladd dated 4-20-53 in which requests for a security survey and installation of a countermeasure device in the office of Admiral Lewis L. Strauss were made.

On 4-21-53 SA [] and [] conducted a security survey for concealed listening devices in the office of Admiral Strauss, Room 226, Executive Office Building. No evidence of hidden microphones was found. Considerable old wire was removed from a wire duct to prevent its use as a microphone cable.

b6
b7C

At the same time, the countermeasure device was installed in the single telephone instrument in Admiral Strauss' office. SA [] was introduced by Admiral Strauss' []

80-760-197-197-197
TAPERECORDED COPY FILE

[] showed the Bureau personnel the Admiral's office and made arrangements for a tall stepladder to facilitate the microphone survey. Approximately 2 hours after the survey was underway [] asked [] why the instruments in his office were not being protected along with those in Admiral Strauss' office inasmuch as the Admiral's lines appeared in the outer office. [] explained that the protective device did not insure against tapping of telephone conversations over the wire, but prevented against the use of the microphone in the telephone being used to pick up room conversations when the phone was not in normal use. [] appeared satisfied and withdrew his request for installation of countermeasure devices in his office.

On leaving [] asked [] "Have you ever found anything on these checks?" [] replied, "I am not at liberty to say but I do feel that these checks are not unprofitable." [] meaning was that security surveys are worthwhile as a matter of precaution. [] did not specifically ask [] if anything had been found. [] did not volunteer that nothing had been found.

No survey of the telephone lines as such was made except the lines in Admiral Strauss' office were checked out to determine that none of them were being used for microphone cable.

RECOMMENDATION: It is suggested that Liaison Section advise Admiral Strauss of the results of this survey and countermeasure installation.

62-97308
cc - 80-760

JMM:VH

62-97308-14

b6
b7C

RECORDED-714
INDEXED-714
EX-100 155
SIXTEEN 900

April 22, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARBO

On occasions the Laboratory representatives are assigned to make security checks of premises ~~outside~~ outside the Bureau, during which time they come in contact with various officials of the Government. Recently, on one such assignment, a Laboratory representative, by engaging in too much discussion, left the impression that he had located a security violation, which caused inquiry of and embarrassment to the Bureau.

I must insist that you properly instruct and indoctrinate the employees under your supervision to the effect that they must be very discreet and not engage in unnecessary talk or discussion concerning their work or the results thereof.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover,
Director

DML:CSH

Note: This grew out of a check for microphones in the office of Admiral Lewis Strauss, on 4/21/53.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Jiang _____
Javins _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Carbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Jandy _____

SEARCHED *5/22/53*
INDEXED *5/22/53*
FILED *5/22/53*

INDEXED-77

56 MAY 19 1953

RECORDED COPIES FILED 5/22/53-15

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: Security check of office of SURVEYS
Admiral Lewis StraussDATE:
April 22, 1953

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Carbo
Parrott
Felt
Moorhead
Reese
Gandy

On 4/21 I received a phone call from Admiral Strauss, from New York.

He advised that his assistant had just called him from Washington and advised that the security check of the Admiral's office in the Executive Office Building in Washington had just been completed by Agent [redacted] of the Bureau's Laboratory; that the assistant had asked [redacted] if he ever found anything in these checks and Agent [redacted] had allegedly stated "This morning was very worthwhile." The Admiral was a little concerned and wanted to know whether we had found anything in his office.

I checked with Mr. Parsons in the Laboratory and had the attached memorandum obtained from Agent [redacted] as to the discussion entered into. It is noted that Agent [redacted] stated Admiral Strauss' secretary asked numerous questions; that on leaving he asked [redacted] if he had ever found anything on these checks, and [redacted] states he replied that he was not at liberty to say, but he did feel that these checks "are not unprofitable."

Upon securing this information I telephonically contacted Admiral Strauss and advised him that apparently his secretary, who had been asking numerous questions, had misunderstood Agent [redacted] that when his secretary had asked whether we ever found anything Agent [redacted] had informed him that he was not at liberty to discuss this matter, but he did feel the work was very profitable as a protection. I told Admiral Strauss that we had not found anything of a security nature in connection with the check of his offices.

Admiral Strauss expressed appreciation and stated that after several months he would like an opportunity to call the Bureau and request a recheck. I told him I was sure the Director would be glad to consider this if he would call at such time as he desired the recheck.

There is attached a memorandum directed to Mr. Harbo, instructing him to caution his employees about too much talking.

56 MAY 19 1953

Attachment sent 4-22-53
KAR

RECORDED-77

62-97308-16

INDEXED-77

APR 22 1953

b6
b7c

UNRECORDED COPY FILED 80-760-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

DATE: April 23, 1953

FROM : V. P. KEAY *V.P.*SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM SECRET SERVICE FOR A SEARCH
OF TWO ROOMS IN THE WHITE HOUSE FOR
RESONANT CAVITY LISTENING DEVICESSecurity Surveys

On April 22, 1953.

✓ 114 ✓
 Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Geary _____
 Mohr _____
 Thompson _____
 Tele Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Strode _____
 Mike Gandy _____

telephone call from [redacted] Secret Service, at which time [redacted] inquired whether the FBI would lend to the Secret Service [redacted] the equipment to be used in the location of resonant-cavity type listening devices. [redacted] stated that the Secret Service desires to check two rooms in the White House and that the check cannot be made at this time without borrowing the equipment from the Bureau, inasmuch as other equipment for this purpose is not in existence.

b6
b7C

[redacted] was advised by [redacted] that it may not be possible to make the equipment available on a loan basis inasmuch as the Bureau has only one set of this equipment and that set was hand-made. [redacted] was advised that it may be possible for the Bureau to make the equipment available with a technician to operate it in order to assist in the desired search of the two rooms. [redacted] stated that the rooms will be available starting at approximately 9:30 A.M., May 9, 1953, and will be available for about twenty-four to forty-eight hours.

It is noted that the Secret Service has placed an order for two units of the detection equipment which is being produced by the facility available to CIA.

[redacted] contacted [redacted] in this matter inasmuch as [redacted] has acted as the [redacted] of the Joint Committee concerned with obtaining production of the countermeasure equipment and security in connection therewith.

b6
b7CRECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Bureau cooperate with the Secret Service in this matter and that this memorandum be referred to the Laboratory Division.

ESS:fjb 5/6 MAY 21 1953

INDEXED - 28 RECORDING - 28 62-97308-17

OK.

28 MAY - 1953

W 101-X3

LEWISON

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HARBO *RE*
FROM : I. W. CONRAD *RE*

DATE: May 6, 1953

SUBJECT: ~~REQUEST FROM SECRET SERVICE
FOR A SEARCH OF TWO ROOMS IN
THE WHITE HOUSE FOR RESONANT
CAVITY LISTENING DEVICES~~

JUNE

Security Surveys

[redacted] As reported in my memorandum dated May 5, 1953,
[redacted] Secret Service, requested passive
monitoring in the two questioned rooms of the White House
this afternoon.

Accordingly, Messrs. R. W. Swartz and [redacted] contacted [redacted] in the Treasury Building at eleven o'clock this morning. Because the rooms were not vacant, the monitoring did not start until about 1 P. M. It continued until approximately 4:45 P. M. in the President's Office and in the Cabinet Room. Nothing was heard.

Although the initial request concerned two rooms, [redacted] stated that the private study was not available today for passive monitoring, but that it would be available this weekend.

The complete situation regarding the desirability of passive monitoring was again reviewed with [redacted] who stated that he did not consider any more passive monitoring to be necessary except for a momentary check before activating the transmitters this weekend.

b6
b7c

He requested that the active monitoring begin Saturday morning about 10 A. M., to which Mr. Swartz replied that he would meet him at the previously designated place with the necessary equipment.

ACTION

There is no action since this memorandum is submitted for your information and according to previous Bureau approval, the active monitoring will be performed this weekend in accordance with [redacted] wishes.

RW

INDEXED - 26 ✓ 62-97308-18

RECORDED - 26

RWS/mek

13

Samuel

Ex. - 101

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo
FROM : I. W. Conrad
SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM SENATE

SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM SECRET SERVICE FOR A SEARCH /
OF TWO ROOMS IN THE WHITE HOUSE FOR /
RESONANT CAVITY LISTENING DEVICES

RESONANT CAVITY Occuritry Surveys

Reference is made to the memo from Mr. Keay to Mr. Belmont dated 4-23-53 which recommended the Bureau cooperate with the Secret Service and search 2 White House rooms. This was approved by the Director.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clagg _____
Glavin _____
Harto _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Pm. _____
Name _____
Gandy _____

JUNE

DATE: May 5, 1953

[redacted] On 5-5-53 in response to my request a conference with [redacted]
[redacted] Secret Service, was held in my office in order that certain
technical problems could be pointed out and to request advice from Secret
Service as to whether or not passive listening was desired on a normal
work day. This approach had been discussed with Mr. Swartz of this section
and is more desirable than passive monitoring on the week-end because if a
cavity microphone is present, the operators of it would know through conver-
sations heard on it or through public sources that the President was not
going to be in the rooms and accordingly they would not activate their
microphone making any passive monitoring of practically no value.

At the meeting the following possibilities were agreed upon:

1. Putting the aperiodic receiver (or just the antenna) in the rooms during the normal course of business. [redacted] felt that this would not meet with approval because of the high level of business conducted in the rooms.
2. Passive searching during normal business in rooms adjacent to the rooms in question hoping to pick up radiation from the cavity microphone through the dividing wall.
3. Passive searching on Saturday when it is general knowledge that the President will be out of the rooms in question followed by active searching on the same week-end. C

Active searching would follow on the week-end if negative results were obtained either under plan 1 or 2.

As agreed, [redacted] later phoned me today and advised that an unscheduled golf game will make the rooms available for passive monitoring tomorrow afternoon.

INDEXED - 28 162-97308-14

RECOMMENDATION

EX - 10B

२८

MAY 18 1956

Unless advised to the contrary 2 men from this section will perform a passive search of 2 rooms at the White House tomorrow afternoon when the rooms in question will not be in use.

cc - [REDACTED] Room 7645

RWS:vrh, v. 1

7645
MURRAY H. B. P. M.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓

DATE: May 6, 1953

J U N E

FROM : R. T. Harbo RH

SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM SECRET SERVICE FOR A SEARCH
OF TWO ROOMS IN THE WHITE HOUSE FOR
RESONANT CAVITY LISTENING DEVICES

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Baldwin _____
Gage _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Reece _____
Tracy _____
Lauphlin _____
Mohr _____
Wintecrowd _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Cavity Surveys

The Director has previously approved that we comply with the Secret Service request to make a search of two White House rooms for resonant cavity listening devices.

Arrangements have been made with the Secret Service to conduct passive monitoring for several hours today beginning at 11:00 A. M. Our activity today will consist in having a specially designed receiver in the room to ascertain whether any such listening device is being activated by an outside source. The purpose of the passive monitoring is to detect such a microphone without advising the unknown source that it has been detected.

We have tentative arrangements to conduct an active search for cavity listening devices on May 9 and 10 in the same two rooms of the White House; this will involve the use of actual transmitters on our part to activate any cavity listening devices which might be present. This assignment will be handled by Special Agents Roger W. Swartz and [redacted] of the Laboratory.

b6
b7C

ACTION

You will be kept promptly advised of any developments in connection with this assignment.

I - Mr. Ladd
I - Mr. Nichols

RECORDED - 26

RTH: VH

62-97308-20

S-101

INDEXED - 26

MAY 18 1953

7- P.W.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *R.H.*

DATE: May 11, 1953

FROM : I. W. Conrad *IWC*

JUNE

SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM SECRET SERVICE FOR A SEARCH OF
TWO ROOMS IN THE WHITE HOUSE FOR
RESONANT CAVITY LISTENING DEVICESSecurity Surveys

The Director approved the search of certain rooms in the White House for resonant cavity listening devices as originally set forth in the memo from Mr. Keay to Mr. Belmont dated 4-23-53.

Accordingly, SA's [redacted] and R.W. Swartz of this section conducted the search and completed it at 4:30 pm 5-10-53. No resonant cavity listening device was found. Rooms searched were the President's study on the second floor of the main building, the cabinet room and the President's office, both in the west wing.

[redacted] Secret Service, who placed the original request was advised of the negative results of the test and he stated further advice to other persons in his organization was not necessary. [redacted] orally expressed his appreciation for the assistance rendered by the Bureau when Messrs. [redacted] and Swartz completed the assignment.

For record purposes it is noted that Secret Service personnel accompanied the above Bureau Agents at all times during the search. This personnel included [redacted] and [redacted] who, according to [redacted] were all cleared to receive the classification of information involved in the search. In addition, Lt. Col. George J. McNally, Signal Corps Security Officer of the White House and Lt. Col. Robert L. Schulz, Military Aid to the President, observed the searching activity for a short time on 5-9-53 since, according to [redacted] they had a direct interest in the operation.

The searching conducted on 5-9, 10-53 was "active" in that energizing transmitters were used to complete the searching operation. My memo to you of 5-6-53 on this subject reported negative results obtained from "passive" searching, without the use of any transmitter, of the President's office and cabinet room in the White House on 5-6-53 from about 1 pm to 4:45 pm.

ACTION

No action requested since the above report of negative results was telephonically furnished to you in accordance with your previous instructions immediately upon completion of the assignment at 4:30 pm 5-10-53. RF Pfafman participated in initial phases of search.

RWS:BLS:vrh

5/11/53 JWS

RECORDED - 26 INDEXED - 26

cc - [redacted]
cc - 105-19581

Room 7645

b6
b7C

Fox 91308-21

MAY 16 1953

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *RJ*
FROM : I. W. Conrad *JW*

DATE: May 8, 1953

JUNE

SUBJECT: ~~REQUEST FROM SECRET SERVICE FOR A SEARCH OF
TWO ROOMS IN THE WHITE HOUSE FOR
RESONANT CAVITY LISTENING DEVICES~~Security Surveys

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Cleage _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Mohr _____
 Gels. Rm. _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

b6
b7C

My memo to you of 5-6-53 on this subject reported negative results obtained from passive searching of the President's office and cabinet room in the White House on 5-6-53 from about 1 pm to 4:45 pm when those rooms were not in use. [redacted] Secret Service, who made the request, stated that no more passive searching was requested and active searching using transmitters could be started at 10 am 5-9-53 and continue through most of 5-10-53 when those 2 rooms and the study on the 2nd floor would be unused. He subsequently has advised that it will be possible to continue the active searching through Saturday night.

For record purposes it is noted that we have no positive information of any practical cavity operating lower than about 1200 mc. A British unit which was claimed to operate on about 700 mc was tested in this section 5-7-53 and gave no response lower than about 1400 mc. Separate consideration is being given to the British claim. Individual transmitters and the aperiodic receiver covering a range of 250 mc to 3000 mc will be used for the active search and a Bureau copy of the cavity microphone will be used from time to time to check the performance of the search equipment. The men will listen for a short time before turning on each transmitter as a precautionary measure.

[redacted] has advised Mr. Swartz that because of the very high level of information involved, he considers it much more important to remove any microphone than to develop the investigative aspects of who is operating the enemy transmitter used with it. He has further advised that he will work with our men this week-end and that Col. George J. McNally of the Signal Corps, who is in charge of technical security matters in the White House, will also be present. Col. McNally was not present during the passive searching conducted 5-6-53 since only [redacted] was there. F

In accordance with your instructions you will be immediately advised if any microphone is found and if none are found you will be advised at appropriate times during the course of the search and at its conclusion.

ACTION

No action is requested since the above is submitted for your information.

RWS:vrh

RECORDED-45

INDEXED-45

162-97308-22

1953

SEVEN for yours

b6
b7C

ADDENDUM: The original approved request covered only the President's study and his office. [redacted] now has added the cabinet room, and the cabinet room will be covered by us unless otherwise advised.

IWC:np

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓
FROM : R. T. Harbo RD JUN E

DATE: May 11, 1953

SUBJECT: A SEARCH OF THREE ROOMS IN WHITE HOUSE
FOR RESONANT CAVITY LISTENING DEVICES
ON REQUEST FROM SECRET SERVICE

Security Survey

In accordance with prior arrangements Special Agents Roger Swartz and [redacted] of the Laboratory conducted an active search for resonant cavity listening devices in the President's Office, Study and Cabinet Room at the White House. The results were negative.

[redacted] Secret Service, who requested this search of Special Agent [redacted] of Liaison, was present during the search and is, of course, aware of the negative results. (Search made Saturday & Sunday, May 9-10).

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo ✓
Alden _____
Salmon _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

b6
b7C

ACTION

None, since Secret Service already advised of search made and negative results.

cc - Mr. Keay

RTH:VH

INDEXED-45

RECORDED-45

EX-103

162-97308-123
MAY 10 1953

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
FILED

6-4-52
LAW

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *RTH*

DATE: May 22, 1953

FROM : I. W. Conrad *JW*

JUNE

SUBJECT: ~~SEARCH OF 3 ROOMS IN WHITE HOUSE FOR
RESONANT CAVITY LISTENING DEVICE ON REQUEST
FROM SECRET SERVICE~~

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Rm. _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Security Surveys

For record purposes it is noted that the cabinet room in the White House which was searched on Sunday, 5-10-53 did not have the American and Presidential flags in it at the time it was searched by engineers of this section. The 5-18-53 issue of Time Magazine showed a picture of the cabinet in this room along with the 2 flags referred to.

Accordingly, [] of the Liaison section was telephonically contacted on 5-20-53 so that [] Secret Service, who made the original request for the search, could be orally advised that the 2 flags and stands in question were not included in the search. It was also suggested that [] be advised that any additional articles or furniture added to the 3 rooms searched should be carefully examined in order to be sure that a cavity microphone was not thereby brought into the rooms.

[] advised Mr. Swartz that [] would be so advised.

b6
b7CACTION

No action is recommended since this memo is being submitted for record purposes.

RWS:vrh *VRH*

cc - Mr. Parsons

62-97308
8mc5-20-53
EX-107RECORDED-45
INDEXED-4562-97308-24
MAY 27 1953F
LIAISON

JW

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *RTH*
 FROM : I. W. Conrad *IWC*

DATE: May 29, 1953

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY

TELEPHONE FACILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR
AND EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE MEMBERS

Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Ladd	<input type="checkbox"/>
Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Belmont	<input type="checkbox"/>
Clegg	<input type="checkbox"/>
Glavin	<input type="checkbox"/>
Harbo	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tracy	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mohr	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Re.	<input type="checkbox"/>
Keasey	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

b6
b7C

On 5-20, 26, 27-53 SA [] and []
 [] conducted a security survey of the telephone facilities of the following individuals, discovering no evidence of tampering on any of the lines:

J. E. Hoover, Director	
C. A. Tolson	F. C. Holloman
D. M. Ladd	J. P. Mohr
L. B. Nichols	A. Rosen
A. H. Belmont	J. A. Sizoo
G. C. Gearty	S. J. Tracy
W. B. Glavin	
R. T. Harbo	

This check included an examination of all instruments in the residences, a check of all appearances in terminal boxes outside, and a check within the exchanges themselves.

Same survey was made for Assistant Director H. H. Clegg with the exception that the instruments in his residence were not examined. Mr. Clegg is out of town and expressed a desire before leaving that we not check his instruments until after 6-8-53.

The line appearances within the exchanges for SAC R. B. Hood and ASAC H. B. Fletcher of WFO were also checked.

JMM;vrh

ACTION: vrh

None. For information only.

62-97308

RECORDED - 110

INDEXED - 110

EX-100

62-97308-25

22 JUN 4 1953

50 JUN 19 1953

100-1000
R. B. Hood
JMM

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo

DATE: June 16, 1953

FROM : I. V. Conrad JWS

JUNE

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK OF DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

Under date of 3-30-53 the Director approved an Executives Conference recommendation that the Director's office space be checked for clandestine listening devices including the so-called resonant cavity type microphone recently discovered in Moscow.

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Rd. _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Accordingly, beginning on 4-6-53 and on such occasions thereafter as the Director's office space was available during the normal work day, listening tests were conducted to determine whether any radio beams could be detected as activating sources for listening devices. You will recall that the limitation to the normal work day arises from the fact that such activating radio beams would not be expected to be in operation after hours.

After completing sufficient monitoring of this type to provide reasonable assurance that no such beams were in operation, an active, exhaustive search of the Director's offices was made after hours, which search included all wall, ceiling and floor space in the Director's immediate offices. No clandestine listening devices of any kind were found.

It is noted that although this security check reflects the office space to be free of such clandestine devices at present, assurance of the continuation of such a secure condition is, of course, partially dependent upon the degree of physical security afforded the Director's office after hours.

ACTION

None. For information and record.

IWC:vrh

RHD

62-97308.

F

RECORDED - 72

62-97308

INDEXED - 72
JUN 18 1953

62-97308-26

Lan

W

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓
FROM : R. T. Harbo *RTH* J U N E
SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK AT RESIDENCE OF Telephone Services ✓
esa
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
4355 FOREST LANE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DATE: July 7, 1953 ✓

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Alden ✓
Belmont ✓
Laughlin ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Hoase ✓
Gandy ✓

Pursuant to prior arrangements Special Agent R. F. Pfafman and 3 technicians from the Laboratory made a security check of the Attorney General's residence this morning. This included a check to see that there were no taps on the telephone lines and no microphones installed anywhere in the residence. Also, countermeasure units were installed in the 6 telephone instruments in the residence.

ACTION

62-97308
That the attached memorandum be sent to the Attorney General advising him that these security checks have been handled at his residence. Also, the Director might desire to suggest to the Attorney General that we check the countermeasure units installed in the office of the Attorney General while James P. McGranery was Attorney General. This suggestion is made because changes may have been made in the telephone instruments, their location, or additional instruments may have been added and we have made no check of the telephone equipment in the Attorney General's office since the change in Administration.

1 - Mr. Nichols
1 - Mr. Holloman

RTH:VH

gmr SP
Attachment *Revt*

62 JUL 23 1953 ✓

RECORDED - 61

162-97308-27
43 JUL 8 1953 ✓

SEVEN

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 09-03-2010

The Attorney General

July 7, 1953

Director, FBI

PERSONNEL ID CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY CHECK INFORMATION
4355 FOWLER LANE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

In accordance with your request representatives of the FBI Laboratory made a security check of your residence this morning. This check disclosed that there were no taps on the telephone service lines and no microphones installed anywhere in the residence. Also, countermeasure units were installed in the six telephone instruments, including the two White House telephones, to protect against the use of radio-frequency listening devices.

RTH:VH


43-71308

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET~~

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

RECORDED - 61 162-91308-28

JUL 9 1953



✓
JUL 7 2 04 PM '53 7 2 34 PM '53
RECEIVED BY FBI 2004
F B I
U S A M P T R I C E

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
F B I
U. S. DEPT OF JUSTICE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: June 24, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH THE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARESecurity of Telephone Services

There is attached hereto a letter from Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, addressed to the Director dated June 23, 1953. In this letter Mrs. Hobby requests that the FBI make a telephone security check at her office and residence, as well as the office and residence of Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, her assistant.

b6
b7C

On June 19, 1953, [] of the Laboratory placed countermeasure devices on the telephones in the offices of Mrs. Hobby and Mr. Rockefeller and on June 23, 1953, [] placed the countermeasure devices on the telephones at the residence of Mrs. Hobby. Mr. Rockefeller's residence phones will be handled as soon as additional work is completed at his residence by the telephone company.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the Laboratory will comply with Mrs. Hobby's request by making a telephone security check at the office and residence of both Mrs. Hobby and Mr. Rockefeller.

ENCL

OHB:lw

Attachment

Check completed
with negative results
JMM 7-2-53

RECORDED - 61

162-97308-29

13 JUL 8 1953

LIAISON 16

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 2, 1953

FROM : R. T. HARBO *RTH*

SUBJECT: *SECURITY OF OFFICE AND JUNE*
RESIDENCE TELEPHONE LINES SERVICES
 OF MRS. OVETA CULP HOBBY, Secretary
 Of Health, Education and Welfare, and
 MR. NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, Under Secretary
 Of Health, Education and Welfare

b6
b7C

Tolson
 Ladd
 Clapp
 Glavin
 Belmont
 Tolson
 Tracy
 Harbo
 Belmont
 Clapp
 Tolson
 Keay
 Ladd

Reference memo Mr. Belmont to Mr. Ladd 6/24/53.

On June 30, 1953, and July 2, 1953, SA [redacted]
 and Technician [redacted] conducted a security check of the
 office and residence telephone lines of the above-named
 individuals. No evidence of tampering on any of these lines
 was observed.

[redacted] arranged through the telephone company to have
 two changes made in the office lines and two changes made in the
 residence lines of Mrs. Hobby, and one change made in one of the
 office lines of Mr. Rockefeller in order to afford them maximum
 security. There were three multiple appearances on Mr. Rockefeller's
 residence lines, but no changes could be made by the telephone
 company since the cable facilities are full.

ACTION: It is suggested that Liaison may wish to report the
 completion of this security check to [redacted]
 Security Officer of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
 who handled this request for Mrs. Hobby.

7-6-53

[redacted] advised.
OAG

JMM/mek

62-97308

...URDEN - 61 | 62-97308-30

JUL 7 1953

47-1141

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *JW*

DATE: August 11, 1953

FROM : Mr. Conrad *JW*

J U N E

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
BENSON FOR A SECURITY CHECK

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Harbo	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Gearty	_____
Mohr	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Sizoo	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Reference memo Mr. Kay to Mr. Belmont 4/7/53, in which it is set forth that Secretary of Agriculture Benson requested that a survey be made for concealed microphones in the Report Room of the South Agriculture Building on 4/6/53. SA [redacted] personally contacted [redacted] Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture relative to the appropriate time for such a survey. [redacted] advised he would contact SA O. H. Bartlett when the room was available.

b6
b7C

Subsequently. Agent Bartlett made three inquiries and was advised by [redacted] each time that he would call Mr. Bartlett when he desired that a check be made of the room.

This has been carried as a pending assignment in the Radio and Electrical Section since April 7, 1953.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this assignment be canceled and reopened when and if [redacted] indicates a survey should be made. Unless otherwise advised, no further action will be taken by this Section unless further word is received by us either from Liaison or from the Department of Agriculture.

62-97308

8-11 OK
R8

JMM:NP

RECORDED-97,

62-97308-32

AUG 11 1953

56 AUG 21 1953

Security Telephone Services

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. TOLSON ✓/m

DATE: July 28, 1953

FROM : R. T. HARBO RTH

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

On July 27, 1953, the Laboratory's telephone contact was requested to make a check of the [REDACTED] residence telephone line, Jefferson 4-1122. On July 28, the telephone contact advised that a complete check had been made of the [REDACTED] line including all equipment at the central office and all wires and the instrument at the residence. No evidence of tampering was found.

The telephone company employees reported that [REDACTED] advised them that [REDACTED] suspicions regarding the insecurity of his line were aroused mostly due to his getting a busy signal frequently when he attempted to call her at his residence from his office. She pointedly stated that she hoped they found something wrong on the line inasmuch as she had indicated to [REDACTED] that she had not been using the phone, when as a matter of fact, she had been keeping it tied up for an hour or more at a time.

b6
b7C

ACTION: It is suggested that Mr. Nichols may wish to advise [REDACTED] of the results of this check. No mention should be made to [REDACTED] of the conversation had by his wife with the telephone company employees inasmuch as this might jeopardize our relations with the Laboratory's telephone contact.

JMM/mek

NOT 1
141 AUG 12 1953

EX-112

JUL 30 1953

R. T. SEVEN

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

cc: TO : Mr. Harbo R/H

DATE: July 31, 1953 ✓ M✓

FROM : D. J. Parsons P/P

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECKS AND TELEPHONE Services
COUNTERMEASURE INSTALLATIONS ✓ JWS

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo ✓
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Mr. Conrad's memorandum July 30 advised of the completion of security checks and the installation of telephone countermeasures for State Department officials. With one exception this completes the security checks and countermeasure installations for all Cabinet members and for all other Government officials from whom requests have been received.

The one exception is that the telephones in the Office of the Attorney General have not been checked since he took office. Such checks were made for Attorneys General McGrath and McGranery. We have had no information on what telephone changes might have been made since Mr. Brownell took office.

RECOMMENDATION

62-97308-33

AUG 13 1953

If the Director desires, arrangements can be made through some of the Attorney General's staff to check the telephones in the office and insure that they are protected with countermeasures.

DJP:VH

Done 8-11-53 by
DJP:VH

62-97308-56 AUG 24 1953

OK. JAS/JW

7-10-53

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT
FROM : MR. C. E. HENNEMUTH
SUBJECT: DR. I. I. RABI

DATE: December 1
1953

b6
b7c

DR. I. I. RABI
Chairman, President's Committee
on Atomic Energy
REQUEST FOR TELEPHONE SECURITY

REQUEST FOR TELEPHONE SECURITY CHECK

[redacted] called from New York on the morning of December 10. He advised that [redacted] of the Security Office, Atomic Energy Commission, had called and asked whether the Bureau could check the telephone of Dr. I. I. Rabi, who is Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy. He said Dr. Rabi has reported he believes his telephone has been tapped in that he hears peculiar noises, there is an appreciable weakening in power, and frequently conversations just die out. Dr. Rabi's phone is located at 450 Riverside Drive, telephone MO 2-3129. [redacted] advised the New York Office that his office does not have available anyone qualified to make such a check.

If you agree, I will instruct the NYO to have a qualified sound man check the telephone of Dr. Rabi to see if there is any indication of a tap thereon.

b GEH:LL ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9-1-85 BY 9145-C-50
248999

RECORDED-37 INDEXED-37 62-97308-
39 DEC 17 1953

367

58 DEC 22 1953

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
FROM : D. M. Ladd
SUBJECT:

DATE: December 14, 1953

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Carbo ✓
John ✓
Tele. Room b6
Nease ✓ b7C
Gandy ✓
~~Kirk~~
~~J. C. Gandy~~
~~Mitterauer~~

DR
"Security of Telephone 5-116-
[redacted], while talking on another matter,
stated that the Attorney General was desirous of having his
offices checked for microphones. [redacted] stated that
either he or [redacted] of the Department would be in
touch with the Laboratory at such time as the Attorney
General's Office would be vacated, if this is approved.

I recommend that at such time as the Attorney General's
suite will be available that such a check be made.

DML:WMJ

OPL.
11.

No action pending
further word from
Dept - 12/12/53
per RTM - JWS

62-97305
JWS

RECORDED - 22

62-97308-35
JAN 5 1954

52 JAN 6 1954

Office Mem

um • UNITED ST

OVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: 1/28/54

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: ~~CHECK OF PREMISES OF SENATOR STYLES BRIDGES~~

Tolson
 Ladd
 Nichols
 Ebelson
 Gregg
 Glavin
 Harbo
 Rosen
 Tracy
 Gearty
 Mohr
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Sizoo
 Miss Gandy

O *at Tel. 8123 Senator* *In Course*
 In accordance with the attached memorandum, I went up to Senator Bridges' office this afternoon and was introduced ~~to the Senator by SAC Auerbach~~, as well as to members of his staff. I told the Senator we would be glad to make the check he had requested which will include his office in the Capitol Building, Suite P 49; his office in the Senate Office Building, Suite 145; and his residence which is Apartment 444, Dorchester House. The Senator appreciated this very much and stated he would get in touch with me in the next few days to advise when this could be done.

I advised the Senator we would make the check at his convenience and that it would be preferable if it were made when he did not have visitors around, as this might give rise to speculation on their part.

ACTION:

I will await the Senator's call and have made arrangements with Mr. Parsons of the Laboratory to take care of this at the appropriate time.

CC - Mr. D. J. Parsons

AHB:tlc

RECORDED-14

INDEXED-14

L-92278-36

FEB 5 1954

25

SERIAL 220

53 FEB 15 1954

5

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tamm

DATE: Feb. 5, 1954

FROM : I. W. Conrad

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE SURVEY FOR
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

Special Agent Service

Tolson	_____
Dadd	_____
Nichols	_____
Brennan	_____
Clark	_____
Gavin	_____
Hafbo	_____
Koskin	_____
Tracy	_____
Gearty	_____
Mahr	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Sizoo	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

1/9
1/11
 On February 4 and 5, 1954, Special Agents R. F. Pfafman and [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] conducted a microphone survey in the following quarters of the House Appropriations Committee in the Capitol Building:

b6
b7C

1. Representative Tabor's office.
2. Room F-2, hearing room for independent agencies.
3. Room F3, hearing room for military affairs.

No evidence of concealed microphones was discovered. The check included a thorough search of the walls and a check of the most likely places for microphone installations in the ceiling and floor. All telephone instruments and electrical wires were also checked.

A total of 14 indications of metal, which could have been concealed microphones, was detected. In each instance a small opening was made in the plaster and it was determined that no microphone was within a half inch of the surface of the plaster. Further use of detection equipment could not pick up any wires leading away from these "hot spots." This was explained to [redacted]

[redacted] of the House Appropriations Committee, and at his request no further probing of the wall was done, although it was made perfectly clear to him that to be absolutely certain from a physical standpoint, it would be necessary to remove additional plaster.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information only inasmuch as Inspector Callahan has already advised [redacted] of the results of this check.

b6
b7C

JMM:KMB

62-97301

58 FEB 18 1954

RECORDED - 40

162-97308-37

FEB 11 1954

13

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tamm

J U N E

FROM : I. W. Conrad

DATE: 2-18-54

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE SECURITY SURVEY
AT WHITE HOUSE

Revised

Tolson	✓
Ladd	✓
Nichols	✓
Belmont	✓
✓	✓
Gavin	✓
Hall	✓
✓	✓
Warden	✓
Tracy	✓
Gearny	✓
Mohr	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Holloman	✓
Sizoo	✓
Miss. Gandy	✓

EN 2-18-54

SYNOPSIS: Following information supplied by Laboratory's telephone company contact, White House officers have advised American Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company officials in strict confidence that "a manufacturer" received confidential White House information by means of a telephone tap. White House refused to supply details of tap and identity of manufacturer. White House requests that telephone company make security survey of its telephone facilities; make telephone lines as secure as possible; supply information as to all known methods of wire tapping; and furnish opinion as to how alleged tap occurred. Telephone company will make physical (but not electronic) survey; will remove all multiple (extra) appearances of White House lines; will advise White House of only two most widely known forms of tapping, thus protecting itself and Bureau on other forms; and will not offer opinion as to how tap occurred due to poor security practices at White House and belief that leak was by word of mouth. Telephone company will not mention FBI in any capacity to White House unless the Bureau indicates a desire that such mention be made and will protect Bureau's interest in countermeasures installed on White House lines. Contact requests Bureau not divulge information regarding alleged tap outside Bureau. Above information should not be discussed with White House officials, telephone company officials or any other persons outside of Bureau due to risk of embarrassment to Laboratory contact in phone company.

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That no action be taken concerning this matter.

2. This information should not be discussed with White House officials, telephone company officials or any other persons outside of the Bureau due to possible embarrassment to Laboratory's contact in telephone company.

RECORDED-53 4-1730-38

8 1954

3. The continued security of the countermeasures will be followed through the Laboratory's telephone company contact.

2/11/54
59 May 26 1954
62-97308
I - Mr. Roach, Room 7649
JMM:VH 3-29-54

LIAISON

Memorandum for Mr. Tamm

b6
b7C

DETAILS: On 2-16-54 the Laboratory's contact at the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company advised SA [redacted] of the following which occurred early in February, 1954.

[redacted], Assistant to the President, and [redacted]
Assistant to the Assistant to the President, conferred with [redacted]
[redacted] of the American Telephone and Tele-

graph Company, [redacted] of the
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company in charge of security, and
plant officials of the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company re-
garding security of the telephone system at the White House. [redacted]

[redacted] who requested the conference, reported that the White House had
definite "proof" that a manufacturer had secured confidential White
House information through a telephone tap. He would not supply the
"proof" nor would he identify the manufacturer or the nature of the
information. The President, according to [redacted] is gravely con-
cerned over the security problem and has requested that something be
done about it.

[redacted] requested the following of the A.T. & T. Co.
and C. & P. Co. officials:

1. A complete security survey of the White House telephone system. This includes the White House Board (normal commercial service), the Security Board (Armed Services operation) and the Police Board (Secret Service operated) with suggestions for improvement.
2. The application of all measures necessary to guarantee the greatest possible security within "prudent reason" as to cost.
3. Information as to all known methods of telephone tapping.
4. Opinion as to how the alleged wire tap (previously men-
tioned) was accomplished.

The Laboratory contact advised that the phone company was going to recommend and do the following in complying with the White House re-
quest:

1. Make a complete physical check of all White House lines. The company is not going to use any electronic equipment, such as, amplifiers, because, while the engineers know that the microphones in telephones can be made to pick up room conversation when a telephone instrument is not in normal use, the company officials do not wish to bring this fact to the attention of plant employees who

Memorandum for Mr. Tamm

will be used in making the security survey. The officials feel that if plant employees had such knowledge, security of telephone communications would be jeopardized in the future.

2. Remove at its own expense all multiple appearances (terminals on a line at other than the place where the phone is being used so that the line can be used at more than one location) both inside and outside of the White House. This will entail considerable cable work and expense.

Suggest the locking of all terminal boxes, wire closets and cross frames, but leave it up to the Government to see that this is done, since primary responsibility for physical security of the buildings lies with the Government.

Make periodic security checks of the White House phone system in the future.

3. Advise that there is tapping by means of mechanically connecting to the line, and also by means of inductive coupling (using an induction coil near the phone or line to pick up the conversation without actually connecting to the line).

The phone company is not going to mention other forms of tapping, such as, making the mouthpiece microphone in an instrument pick up room conversation when the phone is not in normal use. Since this technique also permits overhearing phone conversation when the phone is in use, a serious breach of security of telephone communications is involved. The company officials feel that an admission of the same would be most undesirable from the standpoint of the company's reputation and also from the standpoint of non-security minded White House personnel repeating it as a "choice bit of information."

The company according to our contact cannot understand why the White House does not solicit the advice of the best security agency, the FBI, regarding security measures and telephone tapping and would like to suggest such. (At the request of SA [redacted] the Laboratory contact agreed that the company would at present refrain from any mention of the FBI to the White House in the above capacity. [redacted] pointed out that direct liaison is had by the Bureau with the White House at all times

b6
b7C

Memorandum for Mr. Tamm

and if the White House is desirous of Bureau services it has only to use well-established channels. [redacted] further pointed out that the company mentioning the FBI as qualified in these matters could indicate a close relationship between the company and the Bureau on telephone work, and that this would be most undesirable.)

b6
b7C

4. The company is going to offer no opinion as to how the alleged wire tap was accomplished. The company feels that with one or two secretaries monitoring the phone conversations of their White House superiors, with the knowledge and consent of the latter, good security is breached from the beginning and that the leak most likely occurred by word of mouth rather than by telephone tapping. The company feels that to suggest the discontinuing of this monitoring would be presumptuous and tantamount to telling the White House how to conduct its business.

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b7C

[redacted] raised the question of security of Bureau-installed counter-measures on some White House lines. He was advised that the phone company employees making the security survey would be briefed in such a manner that these countermeasures would not be removed and their confidential nature would not be disclosed. If need for any explanation arises, they will be described as special "security devices for the White House" and no mention of FBI installation will be made.

The Laboratory contact requested that the Bureau make no inquiry of the White House as to the alleged wire tapping incident. He pointed out that the information had been given the A.T. & T. Co. and C. & P. Co. officials in the strictest of confidence by [redacted] and that it would reflect badly on the officials involved if the White House even suspected a breach of this confidence. The whole matter was brought to the attention of the FBI as a matter of close cooperation on the part of our contact so that the Bureau will know what is going on and be in a position to protect its interests and its relations with the phone company. The contact stated that the company feels that if there had actually been a tap, the White House would have reported it to the Bureau immediately because of the Bureau's jurisdiction in these matters.

In making his request to the Laboratory contact that the FBI not be mentioned at this time, [redacted] had in mind the objective of affording the Bureau an opportunity to review the situation before becoming involved.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *jl*

DATE: February 25,
1954 *W.H.*

FROM : A. H. BELMONT *AB*

SUBJECT: *Set 1. T₃ of T₁, phone 111-1111*
CHECK OF PREMISES OF SENATOR STYLES, BRIDGES

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Chase _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

A/
Reference is made to my memorandum of January 28,
1954, reflecting that Senator Bridges was advised that we
would be glad to make a security check of his offices and
his residence.

On February 8, 1954, I talked to [redacted]
in Senator Bridges' office. He said that the Senator was
out of town and suggested that a check be held up until
his return. I talked to [redacted] on February 24, 1954,
regarding another matter and he still did not mention the
security check. I feel that we have made the offer to
conduct the security check and have also reminded the Senator's
office at least once. Consequently, unless advised to the
contrary, I am not going to again raise the issue but will
await a further request from the Senator. *AB*

b6
b7C

CC - Mr. Tamm

AHB:tlc

3 MAR 12 1954 *RHO*

RECORDED - 7

INDEXED - 7

62-77387-39

APR 1 1954
FBI - WASH. D. C.
J. E. G.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

March 10, 1954

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Boardman ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Harlan ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tamm ✓
Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Jones ✓
Mr. Winterrowd ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Holloman ✓
Miss Holmes ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

I have advised Mr. Quinn Tamm that the Attorney General mentioned to you that there had been a leak of information of a meeting in the Departmental Auditorium and that he wondered if we could check the Auditorium for microphones or other listening devices.

I have advised Mr. Tamm that you desire that this be done as quietly and unobtrusively as possible and that a memorandum be sent to the Attorney General advising him that it has been done and the results.

cc - Mr. Tamm
FCH:eff

O Security Survey 5

58 MAR 26 1954

RECORDED - 68 62-47308-40
EX-107 MAR 16 1954

RECORDED

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
REGION 3
Washington 25, D. C.

REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF
THE DEPARTMENTAL AUDITORIUM AND ADJACENT CONFERENCE ROOMS

Constitution Avenue Between 12th and 14th Streets, N. W.

1. The Departmental Auditorium and Conference Rooms A, B, and C adjacent thereto shall be available for assignment to:

- a. Agencies of the Federal Government and the government of the District of Columbia, for official use.
- b. Officially recognized agencies, clubs, or educational units of the Federal Government or the government of the District of Columbia.

The foregoing shall not be construed to include sponsored meetings, meetings of a political, sectarian, fraternal, or similar nature, or meetings held for the purpose of promotion of commercial enterprises or commodities.

2. Application for the use of the Auditorium or Conference Rooms should be submitted at least one week in advance. It should be addressed as follows and include the information outlined below:

General Services Administration, Region 3
ATTENTION: Triangle Area Manager
Room 1408
New Post Office Building
12th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

- a. Name of agency in whose behalf the application is submitted.
- b. Date of requested assignment, and hours proposed for its commencement and termination.
- c. Nature of the contemplated program.
- d. Approximate number of persons expected to attend.
- e. Whether motion pictures or lantern slides are to be exhibited, stating (1) size of film, 35 or 16mm; (2) size of lantern slide.

3. No program shall continue beyond midnight.

4. If the projection of motion pictures or lantern slides is a part of the program, competent operators will be furnished under the supervision of the General Services Administration.

5. Music racks, ushers, and attendants for checking wraps, if needed, must be furnished by and at the expense of the permittee.

6. No admission fee shall be charged, no indirect assessment shall be made for admission, and no collection shall be taken. Commercial advertising or the sale of articles of any character will not be permitted.

7. The serving of refreshments is prohibited.

8. A sample of any literature or folders to be distributed or posted shall be forwarded for review when formal request is made for either the Auditorium or Conference Rooms.

9. All persons attending meetings will be required to go directly to the Auditorium or Conference Rooms and to leave by the most direct exit. They shall be provided with tickets or other identification, except when the general public is invited. No one will be admitted to other parts of the building unless in the possession of a properly signed pass.

10. All persons attending meetings will be subject to the "Rules and Regulations Governing Public Buildings and Grounds," promulgated by the Administrator of General Services.

11. SMOKING IS PROHIBITED WITHIN THE AUDITORIUM.

APPROVED DECEMBER 1, 1953

William A. Miller
William A. Miller
Regional Director

Seating Capacity of Auditorium and Conference Rooms

AUDITORIUM.....	1325
(1500 can be accommodated by setting up additional chairs)	
CONFERENCE ROOM A.....	30
(Can be arranged to accommodate 60)	
CONFERENCE ROOM B.....	70
(Can be arranged to accommodate 200)	
CONFERENCE ROOM C.....	20
(Can be arranged to accommodate 40)	

(Published in the Federal Register, December 24, 1953, 18 F.R. 8700)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-03-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

100

62-97308-41

ENCLOSURE

Attachment A

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-03-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg


DEPARTMENTAL AUDITORIUM

CONSTITUTION AVENUE BETWEEN 12TH & 14TH STREETS, N.W.


WASHINGTON, D.C.

SCALE IN FEET


10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100



MAIN FLOOR PLAN









BALCONY PLAN




CONFERENCE
ROOM-A

CONFERENCE
ROOM-B

CONFERENCE
ROOM-C




SCALE IN FEET
5 0 5 10 15 20 25



N


SEATING PLANS SHOWN
ARE STANDARD AND MAY
BE ALTERED TO MEET
NEEDS.



DEPARTMENTAL AUDITORIUM
CONFERENCE ROOMS

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
REGION 3
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SEATING PLANS



3/15/84

No evidence of recent changes in system.
Wine rack.

Auditorium at 1-50 feet adds little to CO₂ from stage
5th floor.

MA of tier adds in wine racks
at 1-15

Main racks wine racks with ceiling pods

MA in Auditorium.

Ct 16-26 (WEST SIDE)

Ct 34-42 (EAST SIDE)

In Room B.

Results for PR off-music system in room B.

Access to balcony

Bunch small openings above floor level in "wine racks"
of stage (west side) visible in west side of main
space - closest to top wall on bays of balcony
speaking to access to balcony
At full load wine racks with wine barrels
may roll into door in full load over false
ceiling of auditorium.

Access to mezzanine

At exit from stage - at lowest step in west

at cold, transmission "mezzanine" and place in wine

Speaking racks in full load in wine racks, may

roll in ceiling & in projection booth.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tamm

FROM : *J.W. Conrad*

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENTAL AUDITORIUM
SECURITY CHECK
Surveys

DATE: March 15, 1954

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harto _____
Rosan _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rx. _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

I. SYNOPSIS:

In accordance with the request contained in the memorandum to you from the Director's office dated 3-10-54, an unobtrusive security check was made by technical personnel of the FBI Laboratory on 3-12-54 and 3-15-54 of the Departmental Auditorium. The auditorium and three conference rooms along the rear were thoroughly checked, except for normally inaccessible points that would require scaffolding or necessitate considerable damage to the interior decoration. All logical surfaces and areas were covered in the security check with negative results, but extreme vulnerability was found for the entire building because of architectural construction permitting accessible areas around the walls and ceilings. The building is normally open to the public and personal or technical surveillance could be readily established.

II. ACTION:

Such information as deemed necessary should be brought to the attention of the Attorney General.

III. DETAILS:

(A) As a matter of record, the following list indicates the general scope of the security survey reflecting points which were specifically checked:

<u>Points Checked</u>	RECORDED - 68	162-97308-41
Auditorium:		MAR 16 1954
Electrical Outlet and Switch Boxes		
Telephone Terminal Boxes		
Thermostats		
Air-Duct Outlets		
Walls Cabinets or Closets EX. - 107		
Floors		
Walls within reach		
Stage, Below Stage, Above Stage		
Anterooms		
Balcony		
Area above Ceiling		
Public address system, microphones, speakers, wiring, ducts, projection booth.		

58 MAR 26 1954

Attachments (2)

RFP:kmb

Conference Rooms A, B, & C:
Electrical Outlet & Switch Boxes
Thermostats
Air-Duct Outlets
Floors & Floor Ducts
Along rear catwalk behind each room
Between Rooms - Area in Hollow Walls
Area at Outside End of A & C.
Areas above A & C.
Speakers in Room B.
Tables and Chairs, other furniture.
Telephone in Room A.

There are attached hereto:

- a. *Scaled diagram of Departmental Auditorium.*
- b. *Sketch and notes of public address system layout.*

(B) *In conducting the security check, the following observations were made concerning vulnerability of these areas with regard to closed meetings or meetings in which confidential matters might be discussed.*

1. *Wall panel opening from Room C controlling access to catwalk along rear of Rooms A, B and C, as well as spaces between rooms and at each end.*
2. *Small panel in Room 5C-07 assigned to International Training Section handling foreign exchange students giving access to space above entire auditorium.*
3. *Access to area below stage is through the boiler room in the basement.*
4. *Access to space above stage and between Auditorium and Room B is small panel in wire closet off left rear of stage.*
5. *Auditorium and Room B permanently wired up for public address system with numerous microphone outlets available on stage.*
6. *Radio and television loops available in terminal boxes at each side of auditorium.*

7. Telephone main frame on fifth floor directly adjacent to area above auditorium.

8. Building is normally open to public. Side doors must be left unlocked whenever one or more rooms are reserved for use. Single guard usually stationed at desk in front lobby.

9. Tables and chairs are continually moved in and out of three conference rooms, depending upon plan of use for a particular reservation. Microphones and radios could be concealed in such furniture.

RECORDED 63

The Attorney General

March 16, 1954

Director, FBI

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SECURITY C BOX

In connection with your recent inquiry to me concerning the possibility of microphones or other listening devices existing in the Departmental Auditorium I have had the personnel of our own Laboratory conduct a survey for the location of such devices. The survey has been completed with negative results.

Incidental to this survey the Laboratory technicians made some interesting observations which I feel should be passed along. For example, from the security standpoint, weaknesses of such magnitude were found that a person familiar with the building would not necessarily need to resort to technical listening devices in order to overhear and in some instances clandestinely view proceedings in progress. This insecure condition exists primarily because of the building's architectural design, which provides accessible areaways above the ceilings, catwalks behind the wall panels and the like.

Many other factors, including the extensive public address-wiring system, are responsible for the unsuitability of this space for closed or confidential meetings.

I - Mr. Holloman

Toole _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Burke _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Candy _____

RIM:KMB 9:45 AM 3/16/54

COMM - FBI
MAR 16 1954
MAILED 31

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : Quinn Tamm

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENTAL AUDITORIUM
SECURITY CHECK SURVEYS

DATE: March 15, 1954

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Reference is made to the note from Mr. Holloman dated March 10, 1954, advising that the Attorney General requested a check of the Departmental Auditorium for microphones or other listening devices.

Such a check has been completed by the Laboratory technicians and nothing to indicate any such listening devices was found. There is attached hereto a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General so advising him. It was felt in addition that it should be pointed out that from a security standpoint the Departmental Auditorium is a completely unsatisfactory place for holding meetings due to the nature of the construction and the easy access to any and all parts of the Auditorium.

RECORDED - 68 162-97308-42

E-125 MAR 24 1954

RECOMMENDATION

sent 3-16-54
That the attached memorandum be forwarded to the Attorney General.

Attachment

QT:VH

Lamont [Signature]

✓ X

[Signature]

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
ATT: FBI Laboratory (SA IVAN CONRAD)
FROM : SAC, New York (66-1119)

SUBJECT: BELL LABORATORIES,
New York, New York

DATE: 3/26/54

J U N E

b6
b7C

As you will recall, SA [redacted] of this office, on 3/3/54 attended a conference in the FBI Laboratory held with [redacted] and [redacted] of Bell Laboratories, New York, New York.

Since returning to New York, SA [redacted] has been in contact with [redacted] and [redacted]. Both of these men commented favorably with regard to their trip through the Bureau Laboratory which was afforded them in connection with above mentioned-conference.

[redacted] and [redacted] have advised since returning to New York that they see no simple solution to the phone call tracing problem which was discussed at the Laboratory. At the time of this most recent contact, SA [redacted] suggested the possibility of altering the ringing signal slightly on the victim's phone and the possibility of detecting this slightly different signal on the calling phone.

The standard ringing signal is a 20 cycle per second signal with a total of about 40 cycles per ringing period. It was suggested that by altering this current on the victim's phone so as to ring at a slightly different frequency or for a slightly different number of cycles per ringing period, that perhaps this difference could be used as a method of tracing.

[redacted] stated that this approach, in his opinion, was the best thought that has come up so far, in connection with the possible solution to the problem. He stated that he was going to consider it along with other ideas with respect to solving this problem.

[redacted] suggested that SA [redacted] follow this matter with him in a few weeks. I have instructed SA [redacted] to maintain liaison with the Bell Laboratories with regard to this matter and to keep the Bureau advised.

b6
b7C

RJ:
JJH:ALG

W 2/27/54 INDEXED 64-27301-43
RECORDED
EX-129

DR/ J- O'Byrnes

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓, m

DATE: May 6, 1954 ✓, m

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT: Security Survey

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

I advised SAC Kelly of New York that hereafter the New York Office is to check the Director's private telephone line at the Waldorf-Astoria every time the Director comes to New York; that ordinarily he knows the day before the Director comes up there and they would have ample opportunity and time to check it.

LBN:ptm

✓ for ✓ for
See that this done.
A. ✓

RECORDED - 36

12-91308- 44
13 JUN 3 1954

yellow of male
AF

SENT DIRECTOR
5-7-54

63 JUN 1954

EX-123

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ✓[✓]

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 24, 1954

FROM : R. R. Roach

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Glavin _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Tracy _____
 Mohr _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Miss Gandy _____

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY
OF TELEPHONE LINES
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICEJUNE*J.W. Connel*

On June 24, 1954, pursuant to a request, Bureau Liaison contacted [redacted]

[redacted] Internal Revenue Service. According to these individuals, [redacted] Internal Revenue, was convinced, because of interference on his telephone lines on instant date, that the lines were "tapped." [redacted] was very much concerned about this and requested that if possible, the Bureau conduct a security survey of his office lines.

b6
b7C

[redacted] It is noted that shortly after [redacted] took office [redacted] of Internal Revenue during the first part of 1953 and subsequent to a conversation with the Director on the matter of security of his telephone lines, the Bureau conducted a security check on same and installed a countermeasure device. Approximately one year ago the phones in [redacted] office were being changed and at that time the countermeasure device was taken out by the Bureau and in the absence of a further request by him, was not re-installed. As a matter of cooperation with Internal Revenue, it is thought that the Bureau should again make a security survey of [redacted] lines.

ACTION:

If you approve, a security survey will be made.

DJS:lw

1 - Mr. Parsons

62-97308

DLS

EX-123

RECORDED - 18

INDEXED - 18

Completed
6/30/54
J.W. ConnelOft
Jett
28-54

59 JUL 22 1954

Memorandum
7-1-54
J.W. Connel7
9/11/54

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons *Parsons*

DATE: July 1, 1954

FROM : I. W. Conrad *IWC*JUNESUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY
OF TELEPHONE LINES, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE
(Bufile 62-97308)b6
b7C

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont *BELMONT* ✓
 Healy _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons *Parsons* ✓
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy *Gandy* ✓
RECORDED
62-97308-46

Reference memo Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont dated 6-24-54 setting forth a request of [redacted] Internal Revenue, that his telephone lines be checked because of interference on his lines on 6-24-54.

Special Agent [redacted] and [redacted]
 [redacted] made a security survey on 6-30-54 of the following lines
 which appear in [redacted] office, [redacted] Internal Revenue Building:
 [redacted] District 7-2558 (unlisted);
 Executive 3-6400, extension 773 (manual extension off Treasury Department board). No evidence of tampering with any of these lines was noted.

At the request of [redacted] to the Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the countermeasure was reinstated on the single telephone instrument of [redacted]. This countermeasure had been removed in July, 1953, and no subsequent request had been received for reinstallation after work had been completed on the telephone lines in [redacted] office. [redacted] was of the opinion that the Commissioner's instrument was still protected with a countermeasure and on hearing that it had been removed but never reinstalled, he made the request for reinstallation.

In the course of the security check it was determined that [redacted] office secretary was unfamiliar with the 100 key system and because of this was throwing the keys into a position which caused a drain on [redacted]' line. It was further determined that there had been insufficient battery supply for the signal lamps which caused them to flicker, and that a repairman actually had been working in the terminal box containing [redacted] lines between 11:45 A.M. and 1:00 P.M. 6-24-54. The repairman could have been responsible for inadvertently making noises on [redacted] lines while he was working on other lines.

ACTION:

Liaison Section may wish to advise Vernon D. Acree, Chief, Inspection Service, Internal Revenue, of the completion of this security survey and countermeasure installation. 62-97308-46

RECORDED - 18

JMM:KMB

EX-123

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

July 22, 1964

RECORDED-48

7/22/64-47

EX. - 107 Honorable Herbert Brownell, Jr.
The Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Brownell:

Pursuant to your request, a microphone security survey was completed on July 22, 1964, in the designated rooms of our office; namely, your office and conference room, the office of your confidential secretary and the dining room.

No evidence of concealed microphones was found.

Respectfully,

425 10-11-59
RECORDED-48

CAC/ret

(D)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON ✓

DATE: July 14, 1954 *Open*

FROM : D. J. PARSONS ✓

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

By memorandum from Mr. Ladd to the Director 12/14/53, Mr. Ladd reported that [redacted] stated that the Attorney General was desirous of having his offices checked for microphones and that [redacted] of the Department would subsequently advise when it was convenient to the Attorney General. The Director approved this security check.

[redacted] called me this afternoon and advised that this had been overlooked in the Department and he was now calling to ascertain if it would be convenient to make this check of the Attorney General's office on Wednesday, July 21 or Thursday, July 22. He said that arrangements would be made so that we could contact Miss Tyson in the Attorney General's office.

I told [redacted] that unless I advised him otherwise, we would make this check on Wednesday, July 21, 1954.

ACTION: Unless otherwise advised, we will make the security check as indicated.

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols

DJP/mek

62-97308

Check completed 7-22-54
Memo dated 7-22-54 refection
Top secret - CIO

RECORDED-92 1 / 77-22-47

~~19 JUL 1954~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 22, 1954

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

In my memorandum of July 14, 1954, I advised that arrangements had been completed to make a microphone security survey in the office suite of the Attorney General, Department of Justice Building, in response to his request.

On July 21 and 22, SA [redacted] and [redacted] of the Laboratory made a security check in the private office of the Attorney General, his conference room, the office of his confidential secretary and his dining room. These were the only rooms indicated by [redacted] that required checking.

b6
b7C

Pursuant to the request of [redacted] Department of Justice Security Officer, he was orally informed of the completion of the survey and that no evidence of concealed microphones was found.

RECOMMENDATION: That the attached letter be forwarded to the Attorney General advising him of the results of the survey.

RECOMM'D - 25

62-1746-48

Attachment

Done

CKC/mek

23 hot orally

cc: Mr. Boardman

Mr. Nichols

12 AUG 1954

[redacted]

PA-113

2026 133.0

CAR WAD

b6
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

FROM : I. W. Conrad

DATE: Jan. 10, 1955

JUNE

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK OF
RESIDENCE TELEPHONE LINES
OF SECRETARY HOBBY AND
UNDERSECRETARY ROCKEFELLER OF
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EDUCATION & WELFARE
(Bufile 62-97308)

Tolson	✓
Boardman	✓
Nichols	✓
Belmont	✓
Harbo	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Rosen	✓
Tamm	✓
Sizoo	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Holloman	✓
Gandy	✓

Security Surveys

By memorandum dated 12-14-54 [redacted]
(former Special Agent), Director of Security of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, requested that a security check be made of the residence telephone lines of Secretary Oveta Culp Hobby and Undersecretary Nelson A. Rockefeller of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Special Agent [redacted] and Technician [redacted]
[redacted] completed this check on January 6 and 7,
1955. No evidence of tampering on any of the six lines involved was noted.

b6
b7C

At the Dupont exchange loose connections were found on the cable terminals of Secretary Hobby's White House lines. These connections were resoldered. It was also discovered that a multiple of Secretary Hobby's unlisted telephone line existed in the basement of the apartment house at 1915 Kalorama Road, Northwest. Secretary Hobby resides at 2101 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, Apartment 87. Arrangements were made by Agent [redacted] to have Secretary Hobby's unlisted line placed on a pair which did not multiple between the Dupont office and her apartment. This was completed on 1-7-55.

ACTION:

It is suggested that SA D. J. Sullivan of the Liaison Section make this information available to [redacted]

1 - Mr. D. J. Sullivan

JMM:KMB
(5) 1/2

RECORDED-35
INDEXED-35

1-27-55
JW

EX-125

OK

1-27-55

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT


TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *ME*

DATE:

January 26, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *R**JUNE 1955*SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SECURITY SURVEYS FOR
SECRETARY OF LABOR MITCHELL

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizob
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy



PAUL
 James P. Mitchell, Department of Labor, has requested a technical security survey of the office and residence telephones of Secretary Mitchell. We have in the past extended this service to other members of the Cabinet.

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised that Secretary Mitchell has recently been concerned about leaks of information out of the Department of Labor and although they have no evidence that this is a result of telephone taps, Secretary Mitchell would appreciate any assurance the Bureau could give in this regard. *[redacted]* has furnished a list of the telephone lines to be checked, which is attached.

ACTION:

With your approval, this memorandum should be furnished to the Laboratory Division for appropriate handling.

*ENCL,**3*
59 MAR 28 1955

Attachment

JTD:fjb *f*

(5)

62-973-7

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Parsons

1 - Section tickler

1 - Mr. Daunt

Note left at 6:15 p.m.

Received - 1 line

as of 3-15-55

Per request of "Shad" on 3-15-55

in addition, "Ward"

RECORDED-35

INDEXED-35

62-973-7-51

38 FEB 1 1955

SEARCHED

INDEXED

FILED

SERIALIZED

3-15-55

JMM:ctw

3/2/55
Gibson's name
3/15/55 at 4:00 PMas date for off.
JMMas date for off.
JMM3/15/55
JMM:ctwName
Re: (confidential)
3-15-55

JMM:ctw

4/1/55

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: February 16,
1955

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

SUBJECT: APPROPRIATIONS HEARINGS
FISCAL YEAR 1956
BEFORE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS HANDLING STATE, JUSTICE
AND JUDICIARY AND RELATED AGENCIES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parson
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

This morning the writer visited with [redacted] to ascertain any developments thus far in the hearings conducted by this Subcommittee before whom the Director is tentatively scheduled to appear at 10:00 A.M. on February 23, 1955.

[redacted] advised the writer that based on the proceedings to date, he feels that the 10:00 A.M. February 23rd date for the Director to appear to testify will materialize. He pointed out, however, should they cancel any hearings between now and that time it would, of course, affect the Director's appearance date. He indicated he would know more definitely on this on Friday, February 18, 1955.

[redacted] upon inquiry advised the writer that there has been no definite pattern of questions apparent up to this point in the hearings and in fact, there have not been too many questions asked at all. He stated that thus far Congressmen Rooney and Bow have been the two most consistent in attendance at the hearings with Congressmen Coudert, Sikes and Preston present intermittently. To date, Congressman Cleverger has not returned to duty from his illness. [redacted] opined that in all probability there would be better representation during the Director's appearance than at any of the hearings presently being conducted.

[redacted] stated that he has had no opportunity to go over in minute detail the justification which we submitted but he plans to do this over the weekend and if he sees any items which he feels questions might be raised on, he will notify the writer. He indicated that the main questions being asked thus far relate to the reasons for any increases being requested in the amounts of the appropriations.

[redacted] also indicated that he felt it could be worked out so that in connection with the supplemental appropriation request which recently went to Congress in the amount of \$1,100,000 for the fiscal year 1955 to defray the cost of the 15 percent overtime premium pay under the Fringe Benefit Act, that this item could be disposed of at the time of the Director's appearance, particularly if the Director comments on this item during the course of his regular testimony. [redacted] suggested that in addition, the Director have

CC: Mr. Parsons (sent direct)

6-9730-52

NPC:gt

RECORDED

962-97303

EX-1207 FEB 24 1955

COPY FILED IN 66-1475

Memo to Mr. Mohr (continued)

available to submit at the end of the hearings a brief prepared statement for insertion in the record concerning this item of \$1,100,000 for the fiscal year 1955. He indicated that a separate statement would be desirable since separate hearings will have to be published on the supplemental item and for the record the prepared statement could be inserted with an introductory statement by the Director to the effect that there is submitted for the Chairman and the Committee's information for inclusion in the record, a summarization of the need for the amount of \$1,100,000 supplemental being requested.

In conclusion, [] requested that prior to the Director's appearance and in view of the type of information which he discusses "off the record", that he would appreciate it if the Bureau could arrange to have a check made for any microphone installations on any of the telephone instruments and electric wall outlets located in the hearing room. If it is possible for the Bureau to do this, he would appreciate it if it could be done on Saturday morning, February 19th, since no hearings are scheduled for that date and he will be alone in the hearing room at that time.

ACTION BEING TAKEN

A brief prepared statement for the Director's use for the separate item of \$1,100,000 referred to above is being prepared for approval and possible use of the Director as suggested by [] which will be ready for Mr. Tolson's approval Thursday afternoon, February 17, 1955.

RECOMMENDATION

With reference to [] request for a check to be made of the telephone instruments and electric wall outlets in the hearing room for any possible hidden microphones, it is recommended that arrangements be made for a laboratory technician to accompany the writer to [] office on Saturday morning, February 19th for this purpose.

Expedited N.

Parsons
Interim
Add. 2/16/55
JFM
7/16

Yes. Jaglee John 7/16 ✓ O.M. X

SP-3 R.F. Pfleiderer
and J.M. Miller conducted
Security check on 2/19/55.
Found no evidence of
concealed microphone
or tampering with telephones.
2/21/55
DMM

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: Feb. 23, 1955

FROM : I. W. Conrad

~~SUBJECT:~~ SECURITY CHECK OF HEARING ROOM
 OF HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
 FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIARY AND RELATED AGENCIES
 (Bufile 62-97308)

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Callahan to Mr. Mohr dated February 16, 1955, wherein [redacted] requested of Mr. Callahan that a security check be made in the House hearing room for Justice, Commerce and related agencies.

On 2-19-55 SA's R. F. Pfafman and [redacted] conducted a security survey of this room and found no indication of concealed microphone installations in the telephone instruments, electric wall outlets and baseboards of the hearing room. The search was limited to these locations at the request of [redacted]

b6
b7CACTION:

None, for information. Mr. Callahan and [redacted] were present during the course of the security check and are aware of the results.

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan

JMM:KMB

RECORDED-11
INDEXED-11

12-72308-53

21 FEB 28 1955

SEVEN

86
15 MAR 3 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: March 8, 1955

FROM : I. W. Conrad

JUNE

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SECURITY SURVEYS
FOR SECRETARY OF LABOR MITCHELL
(Bufile 62-97308)

Tolson	
Boardman	
Nichols	
Brown	
Marbo	
Mohe	
Parsons	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Sizoo	
Winterrowd	
Telle, Room	
Holloman	
Gandy	

By memorandum from Mr. R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont on January 26, 1955, a request was made by [redacted] Executive b6 Assistant, for a technical survey of the telephone lines in the office and residence of Secretary of Labor Mitchell. [redacted] named March 7 as the earliest convenient date.

On 3-7-55 SA [redacted] and [redacted] checked the office lines of Secretary Mitchell and observed no evidence of tampering. During the course of the survey it was determined that four of the office lines involved had multiple appearances (terminals) located in Temporary Building T, Interstate Commerce Commission Building, and the Raleigh Hotel. Arrangements were made with the telephone company so that all lines serving Secretary Mitchell's office now run through cable so that there will be no appearances except in the Secretary's office and in the exchange buildings.

The lines checked were as follows: Executive 3-8368 (unlisted), Executive 3-4779 (unlisted), Executive 3-2665, Executive 3-2666, Executive 3-2420, extensions 0, 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

It is suggested that the Liaison Section may wish to advise Secretary Mitchell's office of the result of the survey of his office lines. A survey of the residence lines will be conducted at a later date at the convenience of Secretary Mitchell.

I - Mr. Daunt

JMM:KMB
(5)

29 MAR 18 1955

RECORDED - 43

INDEXED - 43

Done
3-11-55
JW

62-97308-54
25 MAR 15 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: 3-15-55

FROM : I. W. Conrad

JUNESUBJECT: TECHNICAL SECURITY SURVEYS FOR
SECRETARY OF LABOR MITCHELL

Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Boardman	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Harbo	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mohr	<input type="checkbox"/>
Parsons	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tamm	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sizoo	<input type="checkbox"/>
Winterrowd	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Holloman	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

By memorandum from R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, 1-26-55, a request from [redacted] Executive Assistant, was made for a technical security survey on the office and residence telephone lines of Secretary of Labor Mitchell and on the residence telephone line of [redacted]

Checks of Secretary Mitchell's residence line, Emerson 2-9382, and [redacted] residence line, Lockwood 5-1664, were made by FBI Laboratory technicians on 3-14-55. No evidence of tampering was noted on either line. March 14 was the earliest date set by [redacted] as being convenient to Secretary Mitchell and himself.

ACTION:b6
b7C

It is suggested that the Liaison Section may desire to advise Secretary Mitchell of the results of this security check. No further work is to be done inasmuch as the Secretary's office lines were checked on 3-7-55.

Done
3-18-55
JRW

1 - Mr. Daunt

RECORDED-32

JMM:ctw
(6) ctw

67-97308- 55

EX-121

22 MAR 26 1955

89 MAR 26 1955

FBI - WASH. D. C.

oغا information handled per letter d. 6/6/11

Memo to Mr. Belmont
from Mr. Roach

RE: [redacted]

INTERNAL SECURITY - [redacted]

[redacted]
It is possible that the [redacted] technician
gained access to some spare lines or multiples leading into the b1
[redacted] If such lines exist, it is plausible that he b6
could have tapped into lines which led to other Embassies. Such b7C
a situation raises a question as to whether Soviet or satellite b7D
establishments in Washington, D.C., have access to terminal
boxes on their premises which would give them access to lines
such as those reportedly tapped by the [redacted] technician.

RECOMMENDATION: We have no technical coverage there

It is recommended that this memorandum be referred to
the Laboratory with the suggestion that through appropriate
telephone company contacts the answers to the following be
discreetly obtained:

[redacted]
It is not believed advisable to contact the White House
on this matter until a check is made with appropriate telephone
company contacts bearing in mind that [redacted] information may
not be absolutely correct.

ADDENDUM: (3/28/55)

Parsons has advised that the [initials]
telephone company cable charts would
reflect the various telephone appearances which
would exist in these establishments. I
instructed him to immediately check with
telephone company contacts and examine
the cable charts, to see whether
any such possibilities might exist.

LBV

218

V

X

yes.

✓

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons
FROM : I. W. Conrad

DATE: April 1, 1955

JUNE

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST
EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Bufile 62-97308)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
McNabb 1 _____
BES 100 _____
Barbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons ~~✓~~ ~~100~~ _____
Rosen _____
Tamm' _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SYNOPSIS:

Memorandum of 3-24-55 from R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont
captioned [redacted] Internal Security - [redacted] contains report that [redacted] technician recently listened in at a telephone wire box located in [redacted] in Washington, D. C., overhearing telephone conversations of persons believed to be in other embassies and, in one instance, the White House. Memorandum recommended Laboratory determine from telephone company if Soviet and satellite establishments in Washington, D. C., have access on their premises to telephone wires which are associated with U. S. and friendly government telephones; and if any telephone wires connecting to White House telephones are located on the premises of the [redacted] Telephone company on 3-30-55 reported it cannot furnish information to answer above questions until it makes a check of all telephone wire facilities of foreign diplomatic establishments. This will be completed within a week. Company also advises that wires associated with one White House telephone did appear on premises of [redacted] until recently but have since been removed; and that wires associated with [redacted] lines still exist on [redacted] premises. Company will report results of survey to Bureau and will remove any wires associated with U. S. and friendly government lines which may appear in diplomatic establishments occupied by governments of Communist nations. More than one week may be required by company to eliminate any wires associated with U. S. Government telephones appearing in buildings occupied by friendly governments. One hundred eleven White House telephone lines do not have any extra wires associated therewith which appear at other locations. Company will check drawings which show where White House telephone wires go and effect maximum security for all lines. Office and residence telephone lines of Bureau officials do not have wires associated therewith appearing in foreign diplomatic establishments.

RECORDED-12

62-49308

INDEXED-12

24 APR 18 1955

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Papich,

RLM: JMM/kmb

ACTION:

1. Laboratory will closely follow progress of telephone company in eliminating wiring which permits some portions of telephone lines of U. S. and friendly governments to appear at other locations where they would be susceptible to listening-in activities.

2. Laboratory will obtain a list (a) setting forth situations as of 3-30-55 where, within the scope of this survey, telephone lines appeared on the premises of other establishments, and (b) setting forth the identity of such telephone line appearances which were eliminated since 3-30-55.

When this has been done,
we should send memos
to AS and [redacted] and

write [redacted]

BACKGROUND:

4.3

b6
b7C
b7D

Memorandum from R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont. 3-24-55,
captioned [redacted] Internal Security - [redacted] reported
that a [redacted] technician in the course of a recent security survey
of the [redacted] in Washington, D. C., had listened in on tele-
phone lines which were physically located within the premises of the
[redacted] overhearing conversations which appeared to emanate
from telephone lines connected with embassies of other nations and
one conversation which appeared to be on a White House telephone line.
Referenced memorandum recommended Laboratory contact the telephone
company to determine whether the diplomatic establishments of Soviet
and satellite governments in Washington, D. C., have access, by
listening in on wires which appear in their buildings, to any tele-
phone lines of the U. S. Government or of diplomatic establishments

of friendly nations. It was further recommended that it be determined if there were any wires associated with White House telephone lines which appeared on the premises of the [redacted]

b7D

DETAILS:

A list of all foreign diplomatic establishments with their addresses and telephone numbers was obtained from the Domestic Intelligence Division and furnished to the Laboratory's telephone company contact on 3-30-55. The contact was requested to add to the above list of published telephone numbers all nonpublished telephone numbers serving any of the embassies. Later in the same day the contact supplied the following information:

Some wires associated with and connected to the telephone lines of the [redacted] and one or two other embassies do appear on the premises of the [redacted]. In addition, wires associated with a newly installed White House telephone line did appear on the premises of the [redacted] until recently. However, the telephone company has since removed these wires, in the latter instance.

In October, 1954, the Washington telephone company initiated its own security program consisting of a planned elimination of extra wires associated with telephones subscribed to by U. S. Government and friendly governments which appeared in diplomatic establishments of Soviet and satellite governments. This program was being carried on along with other regular telephone work. However, as a result of the Bureau's request, the company will accelerate this program, completing this phase of the work in approximately one week, reporting the results to the Bureau. Within this period every effort will be made by the company to eliminate immediately any U. S. Government and friendly government telephone wires appearing on the premises being occupied by Soviet and satellite governments. Complete elimination of such wires associated with U. S. Government telephones which may be appearing in buildings occupied by friendly governments will take a longer period of time. Complete elimination of such extra wires associated with lines of one friendly nation which appear in buildings occupied by other friendly nations may prove to be impossible without going into considerable extra rewiring expense.

For approximately one year the telephone company has been making a quarterly check of 111 White House telephone lines, these particular lines having been specified by the White House. These lines do not have wires associated therewith which appear at other locations where listening in might be accomplished. The company will examine the wiring diagrams or charts which show all White House telephone lines, in addition to the 111 mentioned above, and, if other lines do exist, they will eliminate any extraneous appearances of wires associated with these telephone lines.

SECURITY OF BUREAU LINES:

Security checks of the office and residence telephone lines of the Director and members of the Executives Conference have been made quarterly by FBI Laboratory personnel for the past several years. There are no extra wires associated with any of these telephone lines which appear on the premises of Soviet, satellite or friendly foreign governments.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan *initials*

DATE: April 8, 1955

FROM : R. J. Lamphere *initials*

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SECURITY SURVEYS

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Initials ✓ *Branigan*
Initials ✓ *Nichols*

Branigan

We maintain a file on technical security surveys which recounts the security checks made both within the Bureau and within the offices of key officials for technical listening devices. This file is maintained in my office in its entirety rather than classifying the mail as June and filing it in my office.

ACTION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be considered as authority for the maintenance of this file in the confidential file room maintained by the Domestic Intelligence Division. This memorandum should be routed to the Records Section for its information prior to being filed.

RJL:em
62-97308

Initials

(3)

for G VB

JW

D

RECORDED - 1762-97308-58

Initials

5 APR 23 1955

Initials

RECORDED UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 64-1762-58

Initials

WALTER F. GEORGE, GA., CHAIRMAN
THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, R. I. ALEXANDER WILEY,
J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK.
JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY.
H. ALEXANDER SMITH, N. J.
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA
WILLIAM LANGER, N. DAK.
WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND, CALIF.
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
HOMER E. CAPEHART, IND.

FRANCIS O. WILCOX, CHIEF OF STAFF

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. Brown
Mr. Beardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Smith
Mr. Jones
Mr. Green
Mr. Black
Mr. White
Mr. Brown
Mr. Johnson
Miss Gandy

April 19, 1955.

Honorable John Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Security Surveys

Chairman George has received your letter of April 18, 1955, concerning the security check made of the Committee Room and the adjoining office, on Saturday April 16, 1955.

The Chairman has asked me to thank you for your fine cooperation, as well as that of the three agents who conducted the security check. Your assistance in this matter is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Francis O. Wilcox
Chief of Staff, Foreign Relations
Committee.

Exercice 0 - M3

Francis O. Wilcox

Chief of Staff, Foreign Relations

Constitutional Government, Foreign Relations

Committee.

63 - 9730 3

RECORDED - 71

62-97308-59

© APR 25 1955

APR 20 1955

60 APR 28 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Attorney General

May 6, 1955

Director, FBI

~~SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF GOVERNMENT AND WHITE HOUSE
ESTABLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Bureau File #2-97500)~~

Through a confidential source it has been learned that a recently installed white house telephone line serving the residence of [redacted] Appointments Secretary to the President, had a branch connection appearing on the premises of the [redacted] Washington, D. C. Telephone lines having such branches can be readily tapped wherever the branch connections appear.

b6
b7C
b7D

Upon consulting with the telephone company relative to the accuracy of the report, we were advised that a branch of the White House Line indicated had appeared on the premises of the [redacted] [redacted] as a result of the normal telephone line distribution system, but that the situation since had been corrected by the telephone company and the White House Line no longer appears at that point. It was pointed out to our representative that although the telephone company conducts periodic security surveys of certain White House lines at the request of the White House, the specific line in question had not been included on the list furnished by the White House to the telephone company.

In order to evaluate the general situation in this respect relative to U. S. Government telephone lines, the telephone company is requested to advise whether branch connections of any other U. S. Government telephone lines appeared on the premises of any foreign governments. We have received the results of such a survey heretofore as it pertains to communications-connected diplomatic establishments, and the telephone company has advised that there are no telephone lines of the U. S. Government appearing on any of the communications-connected premises. It is noted, however, that in telephone lines in the District of Columbia have branch connections appearing on the premises of the Yugoslav Commercial Counselor's office, STAR telephone company further has advised that there is no prospect at the present time of any plans to eliminate from all of the communications-connected getaway telephone all telephone lines except those

COMM-FBI
MAY 6 1955
MAILED

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizee _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

RECORDED-45 INDEXED-45 62-37308-60

To Mr. Ellison P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General
Conrad to Parsons
S/S/55
IYC/mek

5/6/55
(e) ✓
59 MAY 16 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 10 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to the Attorney General
Re: Security Survey of Telephone Lines
of Communist and Non-Communist
Sources in Washington, D. C.

Starting the respective diplomatic establishments. The District of Columbia Government lines will be eliminated from the Yugoslav
priorities under this program.

I will advise you further as to the results of the survey
by the telephone company with respect to possible appearances of
U. S. Government lines on the premises of friendly foreign govern-
ments when such survey has been completed.

Mr. Milton Anderson of the White House is being separately
advised.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General (orig & 1)

to Boardman D. J. Parsons
Belmont Sanders
Hennrich Whitson
Branigan
J.D. Donohue
May 13, 1955

Director, FBI

JUNE

SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES OF
COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST EMBASSIES
IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

Reference is made to the memorandum to the Attorney General from this Bureau dated May 6, 1955, furnishing the results to date of the survey being made by the telephone company with respect to possible appearances of U. S. Government lines on the premises of foreign establishments in Washington, D. C.

There may be a substantial question of security involved if there are similar appearances of U. S. Government telephone lines in foreign missions in New York City and in other points in the United States. Because of the implications in the field of Government operations and Government communications, you may wish to consider the advisability of presenting the broad problem to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security or such other Government body as you may deem competent for the purpose of examining the problem and taking any necessary action.

62-97308

MAILED 2
MAY 16 1955
COMM-FBI

IW:fjm 7/1
(11)

RECEIVED MAY 13 1955
FBI - WASH. D. C.
MOON

(A cover memo from L. V. Boardman to The Director was prepared by IW:fjm on 5/12/55, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

RECORDED - 8

INDEXED - 8

REC. MAY 17 1955

Folson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Tizzo _____
Interrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Colloman _____
Andy _____

5 MAY 19 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: May 6,
1955

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNICH

Tolson ✓
 Boardman ✓
 Nichols ✓
 Belmont ✓
 Harbo ✓
 John ✓
 Parsons ✓
 Rosen ✓
 Tamm ✓
 Sizoo ✓
 Winterrowd ✓
 Tele. Room ✓
 Holloman ✓
 Gandy ✓

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL COVERAGE
 SOVIET UNITED NATIONS DELEGATION
680 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY

JUNE

Our technical coverage on the Soviet United Nations Delegation has been discontinued, for security reasons, because of work being performed on the cables servicing [redacted]
 New York City.

b6
b7C

[redacted] New York Office, advised at 2:50 p.m., May 6, 1955, that the repair work has now been completed and it has been determined that the appearances of the lines where we would cover them have now been transferred to the basement of [redacted] which is the building occupied by the Italian Consulate. The NYO, through its contact, is attempting to arrange for the appearance of the Soviet lines at some point where we can effect coverage.

You will recall that recently, through the telephone company in Washington, D. C., a survey was made regarding appearances of telephone lines in various embassies. It would appear from the above facts that there may well be a security factor involved in telephone company procedures in New York also, since we now know that the lines of the Soviet Embassy appear in the basement of the Italian Consulate.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the fact there appears to be a substantial question of security involved if there are appearances of U. S. Government telephone lines in the embassies or consulates of foreign governments in New York and in other points in the United States, it is recommended that a communication be prepared to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) calling its attention to this possible security weakness for appropriate consideration and any necessary action. If you agree, this will be done.

INDEXED-92

RECORDED-92

CEH:LL
(7)

cc--Mr. Belmont
 cc--Mr. Hennrich
 cc--Mr. Branigan
 cc--Mr. J. D. Donohue
 cc--Mr. Sanders
 cc--Mr. D. J. Parsons

6 MAY 24 1955

FW-5/24/55
 to the Director (1)
 FBI - New York (1)
 DA & Pogue (1)

K.

5 PM

62-97308-240-
62-97308-1RECORDED-92
INDEXED-92
FILED IN
APRIL 24 1955
SECURITY INFORMATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: May 12, 1955

FROM : L. V. Boardman

JUNE

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL COVERAGE SOVIET UNITED NATIONS DELEGATION
680 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY

Tolson
 Boardman
 Nichols
 Belmont
 Harbo
 Mohr
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Sizoo
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Gandy

SYNOPSIS:

Re memo from C. E. Hennrich to A. H. Belmont, May 6, 1955, reporting that appearances of telephone lines serving Soviet UN Delegation have been noted in the basement of the Italian Consulate building in New York City.

It was recommended that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) be told that there appeared to be a substantial question of security involved if there are appearances of U. S. Government telephone lines in missions of foreign governments and elsewhere in order that ICIS can give the problem appropriate consideration and take any necessary action.

You asked "Just what can ICIS do about it?"

Certain of the agencies belonging to ICIS, such as Defense, State and Treasury Departments, have a primary interest in the security of their establishments in areas such as New York. The ICIS agencies and specifically the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) are responsible for the broad planning regarding security of Government operations. ICIS has had the responsibility for making recommendations in the security field aside from intelligence consideration to the appropriate agencies of the Government.

It would appear desirable, therefore, to place the responsibility for any broad survey regarding security of Government communications of the type involved on the ICIS. This is particularly true during the current period when Congressional investigations into wire tapping are in progress.

62-97308

RECORDED-92, 62-97308-63

Enclosure sent 5-16-55 INDEXED-92

LW:fjm

(10) ticklers - Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Hennrich
 Mr. Branigan
 Mr. J. D. Donohue
 Mr. D. J. Parson
 Mr. Sanders
 Mr. Whitson

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-77708-1
 INDEXED COPY FILED IN 62-98268-1

6 MAY 24 1955

J.W.

J. W. Whitson

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that we point out to Deputy Attorney General Rogers the substantial question of security involved in possible appearances of U. S. Government lines in foreign missions in New York and elsewhere and suggest to him that he may wish to raise this problem with the ICIS or another body as he may deem it desirable. Attached for your approval is a letter to Deputy Attorney General Rogers.

K [initials] B [initials] J [initials]
J [initials] [initials] [initials]
OK H

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: May 11,
1955

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNREICH

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST EMBASSIES
IN WASHINGTON, D. C.JUNEb6
b7C

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm'	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

[redacted] of the National Security Council, [redacted] called on the afternoon of May 11, 1955, regarding Bureau (Bureau memo) of May 6, 1955, to the Honorable Dillon Anderson, in which we advised we had recently learned that a White House telephone line serving the residence of [redacted] [redacted] Appointment Secretary of the President, had a branch connection appearing on the premises of the [redacted] [redacted] stated that Anderson had referred the matter to him, and [redacted] felt that Anderson should call this matter to the attention of the President's Military Aide who has security responsibility for the White House. [redacted] wondered whether the Bureau had any objection to this being done.

ACTION:

I told [redacted] that the Bureau will, of course, defer to the judgment of Anderson in this connection. I pointed out that the information had been obtained through a confidential source. [redacted] said he appreciated this and would suggest to Anderson that, of course, in furnishing the information to the Military Aide, if Anderson decided to do so, he (Anderson) handle the matter in such a way that the confidential nature of our information will not be jeopardized.

CEH:LL
(7)

cc--Mr. Boardman
cc--Mr. D. J. Parsons
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Hennrich
cc--Mr. Roach
cc--Mr. Whitson

RECORDED-31

62-97508-64

INDEXED-31

C. E. HENNREICH
MAY 11 1955

EX-125

Ty E. H. UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-85308-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. PARSONS

FROM : I. W. CONRAD

DATE: May 5, 1955

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST
EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Bufile 62-97308)

JUNE

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

*B. Tolson
R. Conrad*

Reference is made to my memorandum of April 1, 1955, reporting results of a preliminary check with the telephone company as to what U. S. Government and friendly foreign government telephone lines might have branch connections appearing on the premises of Communist-controlled diplomatic establishments. Telephone lines having such branches can be readily tapped wherever the branch connections appear. The inquiry was further extended to include any U. S. Government lines which might appear on the premises of friendly foreign government diplomatic establishments. At that time, the telephone company indicated that a survey would be made and steps would be taken to eliminate any undesirable situations.

You will recall that this matter was predicated upon a report that a White House line branch connection appeared on the French Embassy premises. As reported in my memorandum of April 1, 1955, the telephone company confirmed the report relative to the White House line but advised that the situation had been corrected. With regard to the survey, Mr. Tolson commented "When this has been done, we should send memo to AG and Rogers and write Dillon Anderson. 4/3." The Director commented "Yes." The telephone company now has advised that although they have had a crew of men working on the project, because of the great amount of work involved, it has not yet been possible to complete the entire survey; however, at our request, priority was given to a check of Communist-controlled establishments, and this portion of the survey has just been completed. The results, together with the identity of the White House line formerly appearing on the premises of the French Embassy, are as follows:

1. A recently installed White House telephone line serving the residence of [REDACTED] Appointment Secretary to the President, had a branch connection appearing on the premises of the [REDACTED] Washington, D. C., but the situation has been corrected by the

I- Mr. Belmont
Mr. Papich

RECORDED - 8

INDEXED - 8

62-97308-65

Enclosures sent 5-6-55

IWC/mek
(5)

MAY 5 1955

7-100
7-100
7-100

telephone company.

2. No telephone lines of the U. S. Government had branch connections appearing on the premises of any Communist-controlled diplomatic establishment.

3. Branch connections of eleven phone lines of the District of Columbia Government appear on the premises of the Yugoslav Commercial Counselor's Office.

4. Branch connections of a total of 43 telephone lines of friendly foreign governments appear on the premises of the various Communist-controlled diplomatic establishments. It is noted that telephone lines of 24 commercial companies and lines of 221 private individuals likewise appear on the premises of these diplomatic establishments.

The telephone company has initiated a program to eliminate all telephone lines from the Communist-controlled establishments except the specific lines which are serving the respective Communist-controlled establishments themselves. As of April 29, 1955, this program had been completed in the Soviet Embassy and Chancery and in the Polish Embassy. Completion of the program with respect to the remaining Communist-controlled establishments is in progress.

Although, because of the unexpectedly large amount of work involved in making the survey and correcting the situations found, it has not been possible for the telephone company to complete the survey with respect to telephone lines which appear on the premises of friendly foreign governments, it is suggested that we have sufficient information to warrant furnishing a report at this time.

ACTION:

Accordingly, there are attached hereto for approval communications to the Attorney General and Rogers and to Dillon Anderson.

✓ P gm ✓ ✕

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-12-2011

RECORDED 8

62-97308-65

May 6, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Dillon Anderson
Special Assistant to the President
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Anderson:

Through a confidential source it has been learned that a recently installed White House telephone line serving the residence of [redacted] Appointment Secretary to the President, had a branch connection appearing on the premises of the [redacted] Washington, D. C. Telephone lines having such branches can be readily tapped wherever the branch connections appear.

Upon checking with the telephone company relative to the accuracy of the report, we were advised that a branch of the White House line indicated had appeared on the premises of the [redacted] as a result of the normal telephone line distribution system, but that the situation since had been corrected by the telephone company and the White House line no longer appears at that point. It was pointed out to our representative that although the telephone company conducts periodic security surveys of certain White House lines at the request of the White House, the specific line in question had not been included on the list furnished by the White House to the telephone company.

In order to evaluate the general situation in this respect relative to U. S. Government telephone lines, the telephone company was requested to advise whether branch connections of any other U. S. Government telephone lines appeared on the premises of any foreign governments. We now have received the results of such a survey insofar as it pertains to Communist-dominated diplomatic establishments, and the telephone company has advised that there are no telephone lines of the U. S. Government appearing on any of the Communist-dominated premises. The telephone company further has advised that there is in progress at the present time a program to eliminate from all of the Communist-dominated diplomatic establishments all telephone lines except those serving the respective diplomatic establishments.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

1 WC/nek (6) cover memo
Conrad to Parsons
6 MAY 1955
1500 5/5/55
WC/nek

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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b7C
b7D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable Dillon Anderson
Special Assistant to the President
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

I will advise you further as to the results of
the survey by the telephone company with respect to possible
appearances of U. S. Government lines on the premises of
friendly foreign governments when such survey has been
completed.

Sincerely yours,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: May 26, 1955

FROM : R. E. Miller

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST
EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Bufile 62-97308)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Re Mr. Conrad's memoranda to you of 4-1-55 and 5-5-55 regarding elimination by telephone company of branch connections of telephone lines of U. S. Government and friendly foreign governments from premises of Communist-controlled diplomatic establishments. These branch connections would permit easy tapping of telephone lines on which they appear.

On 5-25-55 Laboratory's telephone company contact reported that company had on that date completed elimination of all telephone lines from Communist diplomatic establishments except those lines actually serving the establishments. Following establishments were involved: Soviet Embassy and Chancery, Office of Soviet Military and Naval Attachés, Soviet Embassy School, Polish Embassy, Polish Embassy Annex, Roumanian Legation, Roumanian Chancery, Czechoslovakian Embassy, Hungarian Legation, Yugoslav Embassy, Office of Yugoslav Military, Naval and Air Attachés, Office of Yugoslav Commercial Counselor, and Residence of Yugoslav Ambassador.

Company is presently making survey of diplomatic establishments of 71 friendly foreign governments to determine whether branch connections of U. S. Government telephone lines appear in any of these establishments. Also to be determined is whether branch connections of one friendly foreign government appear in establishments of other friendly foreign governments.

ACTION: ... 31

Laboratory will follow this matter closely to assure that Bureau is advised of completion of survey at earliest possible date.

PRMM:KMB
(4)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Papitch

RECORDED - 8

62-97308-66

JUN 1 1955

5

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. MOORE

DATE: May 2, 1955

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

SUBJECT: Security Survey

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 H. C. G. _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Saturday, April 30, 1955, [redacted] of the House Appropriations Committee, telephonically contacted the writer before he departed Washington and stated that in view of the recent developments with reference to [redacted] one of the clerical staff of the Committee whom you will recall had run an ad in the paper to do typing work in the evenings and as a result, had been contacted by an employee of the Soviet Naval Attaché's Office, he and Chairman Cannon would appreciate it if the Bureau could again at this time run a security check of the various Hearing rooms of the Appropriations Committee in the Capitol strictly as a precautionary measure.

[redacted] stated that he would have [redacted] follow through on this in his absence from the city and requested that we endeavor to do this as promptly as possible.

If you approve, appropriate arrangements will be made with Mr. Parsons of the Laboratory to undertake this project.

For your information, in the past two years we have thoroughly covered all of the Hearing rooms of the Appropriations Committees on a security check basis from the angle of any microphones or taps being installed therein and these checks in the past have proved negative.

CC: Mr. Parsons (sent direct)

NPC:gt

3

62-97200

JFM ✓
 SP ✓
 JF ✓

WPA
 5-5-55
 Cont'd
 5-5-55

RECORDED: 8. 62-97200-67

E-201

59 JUN 7 1955

3 MK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: May 5, 1955

FROM : I. W. Conrad

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF HEARING ROOMS AND
OFFICES OF HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

jwcl/Kreahan

Re memorandum from Mr. Callahan to Mr. Mohr dated 5-2-55 concerning a security survey to be made of the hearing rooms and offices of the House Appropriations Committee.

On 5-3-55 and 5-4-55 SA'S R. F. Pfafman, [redacted] and [redacted] and technician [redacted] made a survey of 16 rooms used by the House Appropriations Committee in the House wing of the U. S. Capitol building. This search included an examination of telephone facilities within the room and a check of locations in which microphones would most likely be concealed. No evidence of tampering with the telephones or of the installation of concealed microphones was noted.

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The rooms covered were as follows: two staff rooms in subbasement, B23, B25, F2, F3, F16, F70, P1, P2, P3, P4, the kitchen adjoining P4, G5 and Rooms 228 and 228A in the Old House Office Building.

ACTION:

It is recommended that Mr. Callahan may wish to advise [redacted] clerk of the House Appropriations Committee, of the results of this survey.

JMM:KMB
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62-97308

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EX-126

62-97308-68

2 JUN 3 1955

59 JUN 6 1955.

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UNCLASSIFIED COPY FILED IN 62-97308-68

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. PARSONS

DATE: May 26, 1955

FROM : T. W. CONRAD

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DAD: 5/11/2010 JUNE

~~SUBJECT: ULTRASONIC LISTENING DEVICE COUNTERMEASURES;
MILITARY TELEPHONE SECURITY~~

Telson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont V
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm' _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

As you know, the military presently has under consideration the question of providing adequate security to its telephone installations. Representatives of the Laboratory and Liaison have participated in prior meetings on this subject.

On the afternoon of May 24, 1955, at the telephonic request of Colonel Sidney Rubenstein (former Special Agent), I attended a meeting in the office of Ralph N. Stohl, Director, Manpower and Personnel, Office of Secretary of Defense. In addition to Colonel Rubenstein and Mr. Stohl, there were also present the following: Brigadier General Harry O. Paxson, representing the Army; Rear Admiral R. H. Rice, [redacted] representing the Navy; Major General Joseph Carroll, representing the Air Force; and [redacted] representing the Office of Special Operations in the Defense Department.

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Because of recent publicity on wire tapping and the use of telephones for microphone coverage, the Army had proposed to disseminate very widely extensive instructions looking toward increased security of their telephones. The instructions included such things as placing telephones in desk drawers when the telephones were not in use, or if no desk were available, covering the telephone with a blanket, et cetera. General Paxson indicated that he was most anxious that various branches of the Army be warned as soon as possible about the ultrasonic listening device and about proper measures to protect against it. Both Colonel Rubenstein and Mr. Stohl indicated that they felt the approach should be uniform for the entire Department of Defense and they felt that the proposed draft instructions would merely stir up a lot of curiosity and unnecessary concern. This view was shared by Admiral Rice and General Carroll.

ENCL

ENCL. In response to questions, I indicated that, of course, the Bureau could not presume to tell the Department of Defense what instructions should be issued; however, I pointed out that the ultrasonic listening device had been developed by the FBI Laboratory, and that we were most anxious that it not receive any wider dissemination than absolutely necessary, and for this reason countermeasure devices installed thus far had been restricted to top level Government

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TWG/me k

(5) 59 JUN 14 1955

Enclosure

RECORDED-90
INDEXED-90

RECORDED-90 INDEXED-90 62-97308-69

© JUN 2 1956

telephones. I further pointed out that, as has been reported in the newspapers recently, there are various ways by which a telephone may be modified to provide microphone coverage if physical access can be had to the telephone instrument itself, and that therefore, unless a relatively high degree of physical security were given to telephones equipped with countermeasures, the installation of countermeasures would not provide a solution. (Access to the telephone by an enemy would permit modification of both the telephone and the countermeasure and render the countermeasure useless.) Accordingly, I suggested that one basis on which a decision might be made as to what phones should be protected would be the consideration as to which phones warranted the necessary high degree of physical security. This seemed to be a new thought to them and it was generally agreed that this would greatly reduce the contemplated scope of countermeasure installations.

At the conclusion of the meeting, a revised draft instruction was proposed by [redacted] for consideration by all of the military branches which would merely serve to alert the various military agencies to the general telephone security problem. This draft instruction, a copy of which is attached, received tentative concurrence from the military representatives present.

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ACTION:

None. For information only.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT
24 May 55

SUBJECT: Telephone Security

TO: Secretary of the Army
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Psychological Warfare
Chief Signal Officer
Chief of Ordnance
Chief of Engineers
Chief Chemical Officer
Commander in Chief, U. S. Army, Europe
Commanding Generals
Continental Army Command
Army Antiaircraft Command
U. S. Army, Alaska
USCOB Berlin
U. S. Forces, Austria
U. S. Army, Pacific
AFFE/ Army Eight
U. S. Army, Caribbean
Continental Armies
Military District of Washington
Army Security Agency
Army Intelligence Center

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 5/11/2010

1. Developments in the telephone communications field have proved the susceptibility of telephones to an increasing variety of eavesdropping techniques of such a nature that unwitting breaches of security are possible. These techniques are not all in the category of so-called "wire taps" where the actual telephone conversation can be intercepted, but also involve numerous ways of utilizing the telephone as a microphone even when the handset is properly placed on its cradle. In effect, normal conversation in an average sized office can be picked up by the telephone when the instrument is not in use, unless steps are taken to insure the absolute electrical separation of the handset from the telephone line. Not all Department of the Army installations are at present taking steps adequate to insure against the security threat which these techniques pose.

62 77308-69

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. The Department of the Army is now participating in a governmental study to determine the full measure of the threat to our security through hostile exploitation of our telephones. As a part of this study, an adequate program of telephonic safeguards will be formulated.

3. Pending the issuance of Department of the Army instructions resulting from this study, the following suggestions are furnished for providing interim counter-measures:

a. Remove, where practicable, telephones, including intercom systems, from conference rooms and war rooms, wherein matters of a SECRET or higher classification are discussed, or "deplug" the instruments while conferences are in progress.

~~b. Remove excessive telephone instruments from key offices.~~

b. Inspect periodically for any indications of tampering with telephone instruments, terminals, switchboards and wire lines.

~~c. Avoid, insofar as practicable, any conversation involving SECRET or higher classification in areas containing telephones or intercom equipment.~~

4. Report information pertinent to this matter through G-2 channels to DA.

5. You will be kept advised of developments.

Copies Furnished:

OSD (OSO)

NSA

Air Force

Navy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 5-26-55

FROM : J. A. SIZOO

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF TELEPHONE LINES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-03-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Tolson ✓
Boardman ✓
Nimmons ✓
Benson ✓
Harbo ✓
Mohr ✓
Parsons ✓
Rosen ✓
Tamm ✓
Sizoo ✓
Winterrowd ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Helloman ✓
Gandy ✓

In accordance with your request, there follows an explanation of (1) the manner in which telephone lines are normally routed for the convenience and efficiency of the Telephone Company, and (2) the manner in which the telephone connection from the White House switchboard to the residence of [redacted] was installed which made

[redacted]
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b7C
b7D

[redacted] In making a connection to his residence, the

JAS:AO
(3) ad
Enclosures (2) 124 125
b 5 11 ENCL

64 JUN 30 1955

RECORDED - 76

INDEXED - 76

21 JUN 23 1955

70 R
SEVERAL

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b7C
b7D



In making security checks on the telephone lines of the Director, yourself, and other Bureau officials, the Laboratory located the various extensions from the telephone lines used by such officials and had such extensions physically cut off.

D ✓ ✕

We should have been
alert to this all along
& in future be on
lookout for it.

X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-03-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

62-97308-70

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: Jun 17 1955

FROM : William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney GeneralSUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES OF
COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST EMBASSIES
IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

This is in response to your communication to me of May 13, 1955, referring to your memorandum to the Attorney General of May 6, 1955 in which certain security problems were raised in connection with possible appearances of U. S. Government lines on the premises of foreign establishments in Washington, D. C.

It is my understanding that the General Services Administration which furnishes the buildings occupied by most Government agencies also has the responsibility for furnishing adequate telephone communications and for the security of such telephone lines. It would be my suggestion, subject to your concurrence, that the information set forth in your memorandum of May 6 be furnished to the General Services Administration so that they may institute such further steps as may be appropriate.

In accordance with your suggestion I have taken this matter up with the ICIS which will subsequently follow the matter with the General Services Administration. The ICIS will also determine what Government buildings are not serviced by the General Services Administration. I appreciate your calling this problem to my attention.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-03-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

CC: [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

Chairman, ICIS

RECORDED-16

INDEXED-16

11-2728-71
7/1~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U)

cc: [REDACTED]
cc: [REDACTED]

JUN 14 1955

RECORDED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE: 09-03-2010

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Parsons
Whitmore

Mr. Miller - & Powers
County Attorney General (orig and 1)

• Inventory List

100-97-004 - 71

Reference is made to your memorandum dated June 15, 1966, in which you suggested that subject to
such a recurrence, information set out in this
memorandum of May 6, 1965, regarding possible
appearance of "... government lines on the premises
of foreign establishments in Washington, D.C., be
published in the General Services Administration. You
indicate that the General Services Administration is
responsible for the security of telephone lines in the
buildings which it furnishes on which are occupied by
non-government agencies. You indicate further that
you have spoken the matter up with the Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security (I.S.) which will subse-
quently follow the matter via the General Services
Administration.

Here is enclosed a statement of facts for inclusion in my application for general services administration which you may desire to send or which you may request the IIAI to send in the file your office.


နိဂုံး (၃)

cc - 1 = Assistant Attorney General (attachment - 4) b6
Title * Johnson b7C

cc = 1 = [redacted] (enclosure - 2) .
501 (b) (7) D
Implementation Committee on Internet Security

LW:blb
(9)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____



52 JUL 7 1955

UNRECORDED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 27, 1955

Through a confidential source it has been learned that a recently installed, high level U. S. Government telephone line had an unused branch connection existing on the Embassy premises of a friendly foreign government in the District of Columbia. Telephone lines having such branches can be readily tapped wherever the branch connections appear.

The specific situation in question has since been corrected. However, in order to evaluate the general situation in this respect relative to U. S. Government telephone lines, the telephone company was requested to advise whether branch connections of any other U. S. Government telephone lines appear on the premises of any foreign government in the District of Columbia. We now have received the results of such a survey insofar as it pertains to Communist-dominated diplomatic establishments and the telephone company has advised that there are no telephone lines of the U. S. Government appearing on any of the Communist-controlled premises. The telephone company further has advised that it has completed a program to eliminate from all of the Communist-controlled diplomatic establishments in the District of Columbia all telephone line connections except those telephone lines serving the respective diplomatic establishments.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____ NOTE: This is yellow of attachment to letter to Deputy AG
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____ Rogers 6-27-55 captioned "Security Survey of Telephone Lines of
Winterrowd _____ Communist and non-Communist Embassies in Washington, D. C."
Tele. Room _____ LW:bib
Holloman _____
Gandy _____ (8)

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

111-1113-710

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A corresponding survey by the telephone company with respect to possible appearances of U. S. Government lines on the premises of friendly foreign governments in the District of Columbia is currently in progress but has not yet been completed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. PARSONS

DATE: July 14, 1955

FROM : I. W. CONRAD

JUNE

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE SECURITY CHECKS BY TELEPHONE COMPANY

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

There is attached hereto an informal outline furnished to the Laboratory on a confidential basis by [redacted] This outline reportedly contains the various techniques which the Telephone Company is considering in connection with its current studies of ways and means of improving the security of telephone service, and specifically includes the various types of security checks which the Telephone Company has under consideration.

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This outline has been reviewed in detail in the Laboratory and contains nothing not already known to us in the way of security measures.

It is noted that this document is marked "Top Secret" on the basis of the reference therein to [redacted]

You will recall that we previously have been advised that the Telephone Company and representatives of Bell Laboratories are acquainted with this technique.

ACTION: None. For information and record only.

Attachment

IWC/mek
(4)

62-12114

RECORDED - 87- 97308-72
INDEXED - 87

EX-108

59 AUG 10 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

August 8, 1955

L-121 Director, FBI

SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST
DIPLOMACIES IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

In my memorandum to the Attorney General dated May 6, 1955, information was furnished regarding preliminary results of a survey being made by the telephone company to determine whether there were appearances of any U. S. Government lines on the premises of foreign diplomatic establishments in Washington, D. C. Also, by my memorandum to you dated May 13, 1955, it was suggested that you might wish to refer this matter to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security for possible consideration of this problem in New York and other cities.

This survey has now been completed. As reflected in my memorandum of May 6, 1955, no U. S. Government lines were found to exist in any of the 13 diplomatic establishments of Communist governments in Washington, D. C. In addition, the telephone company has now eliminated from the premises of these establishments all lines except those actually needed to serve the establishments themselves.

The premises of 71 non-Communist diplomatic establishments have also been completely surveyed. Thirteen U. S. Government lines and three lines of the District of Columbia Government were found to appear on the premises of six of these establishments as follows:

FBI
COMM - 8-13-55
RECORDED-74

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

1 - Mr. Belmont (detached)

RECORDED-74

INDEXED-74

AUG 8 1955

NOTE: See cover memo Mr. Millen to Mr. Parsons
8-2-55, JMM:KMB.

JWC:JMM/kmb

(8)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. William F. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

The telephone company has advised that it does not contemplate eliminating all extra lines in these 71 establishments, as it did in the case of the 13 Communist-controlled establishments, due to the tremendous cost involved and the destruction of the flexibility of its system which would result. The company will eliminate appearances of any highly sensitive U. S. Government lines in these six friendly foreign government establishments if specifically requested to do so.

Pursuant to the suggestion in my memorandum to you of May 16, 1955, you may wish to consider having the results of the complete survey presented to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security for whatever action it considers appropriate.

Mr. Dillon Anderson of the White House is being advised by separate communication.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 8, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Dillon Anderson
Special Assistant to the President
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Anderson:

In my letter of May 6, 1955, you were advised that the telephone company had been requested to make a survey of the premises of the diplomatic establishments of Communist and non-Communist foreign governments in Washington, D. C., to determine whether any U. S. government lines passed through these establishments.

This survey has now been completed. As reflected in my letter of May 6, 1955, no U. S. Government lines were found to exist on the premises of any of the 13 Communist diplomatic establishments in Washington. The telephone company, in addition to conducting the survey, now has eliminated from these 13 establishments all telephone lines except those actually needed to serve the establishments themselves.

RECORDED - M. 61-27258-74

The diplomatic establishments of 71 non-Communist governments in Washington have also been completely surveyed. Thirteen U. S. Government lines and three lines of the District of Columbia Government were found to appear on the premises of six of these establishments as follows:

No. of Lines	Government Department	Ambassy where Line Appears
Tolson _____		
Boardman _____		
Nichols _____		
Belmont _____		
Harbo _____		
Mohr _____		
Parsons _____		
Rosen _____		
Tamm _____	1 - Liaison	
Sizoo _____		
Winterrowd _____	1 - Mr. Belmont (detached)	
Tele. Room _____		
Holloman _____		
Gandy _____		

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Belmont (detached)

NOTE: See cover memo Mr. Millen to Mr. Parsons
8-2-55, JMM:KMB.

IWC:JMM; kmb
(B)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7D
P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable Dillon Anderson
Special Assistant to the President
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

The telephone company has advised that it does not contemplate eliminating all extra lines in these 71 establishments, as it did in the case of the 13 Communist-controlled establishments, due to the tremendous cost involved and the destruction of the flexibility of its system which would result. The company will eliminate appearances of any highly sensitive U. S. Government lines in these six friendly foreign government establishments if specifically requested to do so.

This matter is under consideration by the Inter-departmental Committee on Internal Security.

Sincerely yours,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. PARSONS *D*

FROM : I. W. CONRAD *J*

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE SECURITY

DATE: Aug. 12, 1955 *M*b6
b7C

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont *G* _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

On August 9 and 11, 1955, Messrs. Millen and Matter and the writer conferred with [redacted] and Colonel Bliss of the local telephone company in connection with telephone security problems.

[redacted] stated that the telephone company had been approached by representatives of General Services Administration (GSA) in connection with the general problem of affording adequate security to Government telephone lines. He further stated that the GSA representative had been told to contact the telephone company in this regard by the Attorney General. You will recall that the FBI has recently made a request of the telephone company for a survey reflecting any appearances (branch connections) of U. S. Government lines which might exist on the premises of foreign governments. The results of this survey upon the Director's instructions were furnished to the White House and the Attorney General. In addition, at the suggestion of the Domestic Intelligence Division, it was suggested to the Department that the Department might wish to present the broad general question of the security of U. S. Government lines to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). The Bureau subsequently was advised by the Department that ICIS was considering the matter and that GSA was understood to be responsible for telephone security in buildings under GSA control.

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised that he was greatly concerned over the fact that after having made a survey of U. S. Government lines in Washington, D. C., for the FBI, the results apparently had been disseminated to other Government agencies with the result that he was now receiving similar requests from such Government agencies. We reminded [redacted] that the request for the survey had been made as an official request and that he had been advised that it might become necessary to disseminate the results, depending upon what the survey revealed. We further pointed out that the Bureau had been advised that GSA had general responsibility for the security of Government buildings, including telephone service, in those situations where GSA controlled the buildings or had contract for the services. Hence, the reference of the problem by the Department to GSA appears to be a perfectly proper proceeding.

[redacted] and Colonel Bliss both indicated that one of the

IWC/mek
(5)

1- Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 75
INDEXED - 75

16 AUG 18 1955

5 fm

b6
b7C

Memo to Mr. Parsons 8/12/55
Re: Telephone Security

principal problems present lay in the fact that neither the local telephone company nor the Bell system as a whole had yet adopted any specific policy with regard to how far the telephone company would go in removing unused branch connections and whether the company would expect the Government to bear the expense of such security measures. [redacted] pointed out that since GSA controlled Government buildings throughout the United States, the problem could be expected to arise at many points. He was advised in reply that the problem of security of U. S. Government lines throughout the country appeared to be a perfectly proper question for GSA to raise and that we could not presume to tell him what action the company or the Bell system should take in response to GSA's inquiry, either with regard to the specific local inquiry or with regard to the broad question, should it arise on the scale which he anticipated.

While [redacted] appeared greatly disturbed over the prospect of having to discuss telephone security problems with representatives of GSA and possibly other Governmental agencies, and stated that he would much prefer to handle all such matters through the FBI, it was pointed out to [redacted] that it would not be proper or possible for the Bureau to undertake the over-all problem. We did indicate, however, that in addition to our own telephone security problems, we would expect to continue to come to the company for assistance in occasional security checks as we have done in the past. The telephone company representatives advised that they would, of course, provide the Bureau with the same cooperation and services which the company has extended in the past.

ACTION:

None. For information only.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons *D*
 FROM : R. L. Miller *PN*

DATE: Aug. 11, 1955

JUNE

SUBJECT: ~~REQUEST FOR TELEPHONE SECURITY CHECK
FOR JOHN B. HOLLISTER, DIRECTOR
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION~~

Reference is made to July 29, 1955, memorandum from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont in which is set out a request by [redacted] of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) for a security check of the office telephone lines of Mr. Hollister, Director of the ICA.

Special Agent [redacted] and [redacted] conducted a security survey of four office lines and one White House extension working out of Mr. Hollister's office in Room 513 of the Maiatico Building, 806 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C., on 8-10-55. No evidence of tampering was observed on any of these five lines. However, a branch extension of the White House line was found to appear in Room 613 of the Maiatico Building. Arrangements were made with the telephone company to have this branch extension removed so that no access could be had to this White House line except at the telephone company exchanges.

b6
b7CRECOMMENDATION:

That the Liaison Section may wish to advise [redacted] of the results of this security check.

62-97308

Washington
Received 8/11/55.
info / G.W.

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Roach

JMM:KMB

(6)

7mm

*JWS**SP**P*

RECORDED - 30 *3-1955-1* 76
INDEXED - 30 2 AUG 19 1955

58 AUG 23 1955 1111

1
7

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 29, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TELEPHONE SECURITY
CHECK FOR JOHN B. HOLLISTER
DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

On July 28, 1955, [redacted] of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) called Liaison Agent [redacted] and stated that Mr. Hollister, the new Director of ICA, had moved into his permanent office in Room 513 of the Maitaico Building at 806 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Mr. Hollister has a White House direct line in his office.

[redacted] stated he would appreciate if the Bureau could make the telephone security check of the phones in Mr. Hollister's office. [redacted] stated that if the Bureau could do this he would be glad to arrange the time convenient to the Bureau. b6 b7C

ACTION:

It is recommended that the Bureau make a telephone security check of the phones in Mr. Hollister's office.

*Memorandum
July 29, 1955.
R.R.R.
CWB:fjb
(5)*

*D.A. 7-29-55
OK MB AV/P
PL*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bates

*Liaison Section
8/1/55
No P.D. handling arrangements*

*Check to be made 12:30 PM
8/10/55 - 10:00 AM
8/9/55*

*5 AUG 23 1955
fcl*

RECORDED - 30

66-37208-77

2 AUG 19 1955

7
7
7

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. PARSONS

FROM : I. W. CONRAD

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE SECURITY

DATE: Aug. 31, 1955

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm' _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to my memorandum of August 12, 1955, relative to the above-entitled matter reflecting the results of an interview with officials of the local telephone company.

You will recall that at the request of the FBI, the telephone company recently made a survey to determine whether any extra telephone connection of U. S. Government lines appeared on the premises of foreign governments. The results of this survey, upon the Director's instructions, were furnished to the White House and to the Attorney General. It is noted that as a result of the survey, 13 U. S. Government lines and 3 District of Columbia lines were found with extra appearances on the premises of friendly foreign governments as previously reported. At the time of the completion of the survey, the telephone company representative advised that these extra appearances would not be eliminated except upon specific request.

b6
b7C

Since informal discussions had indicated that the telephone company might change this policy, I contacted [] on August 30, 1955, in order to keep in touch with the situation. [] advised in response to my inquiry that the telephone company has the matter under consideration with the objective of removing the apparent U. S. Government and District of Columbia telephone connections which appear on the premises of foreign governments at this time. I requested to be advised when such removal had been completed on the 16 lines mentioned above. [] indicated that this job was approximately 50% completed and he expected all of the work to be done by the end of the week. He further indicated that he would advise the Bureau upon completion.

ACTION: Telephone company progress in removing U. S. Government and District of Columbia lines from the premises of friendly foreign governments will be followed by the Laboratory and reported upon completion.

IWC/mek
(5)

1- Mr. Belmont

MEMO to P.G.
IWC/mek
9/6

62-77318-78

17 SEP 7 1955

RECORDED - 39

SEVEN

59 SEP 13 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. PARSONS

DATE: Aug. 30, 1955 ✓

FROM : R. L. MILLER

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST
EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Bufile 62-97308)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Reference 8/2/55 memorandum from Mr. Millen to
Mr. Parsons and 8/13/55 memorandum from Mr. Nichols to
Mr. Parsons regarding above subject matter. Referenced
8/13/55 memorandum requested that a memorandum be prepared
from the Director to the Attorney General which the Director
could take up with the Attorney General on his return.

ACTION:

Attached is a suggested memorandum summarizing all
the information concerning this particular security survey.

Enclosure

sent 9-7-55

JMM/IWC/meb

(5)

8 SEP 16 1955

RECORDED-11
EX-102

17 SEP 8 1955

SEVENTY
S-2452

62-97308-79

The Attorney General

September 6, 1955

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
**SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST
PREDATORS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.**

As I advised you in my memorandum of May 6, 1955, this Bureau learned through a confidential source that the White House telephone line in the residence of [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] Upon inquiry of the telephone company, we were advised that this condition had existed, as a result of the manner in which the telephone company normally distributes its lines to gain maximum flexibility of service, but that it had been corrected so that [redacted]

[redacted] This incident prompted the Bureau to request the telephone company to survey their system and advise whether other U. S. Government lines appeared on the premises of any of the numerous foreign diplomatic establishments in Washington, D. C. The completed survey of 84 establishments reflects the following:

1. No U. S. Government lines appear on the premises of the [redacted] in Washington.

2. [redacted] lines did appear on the premises of the Yugoslav Commercial Counselor's Office, but this condition has been corrected.

3. The telephone company has removed all telephone lines from [redacted] except those actually needed to serve these establishments.

4. In [redacted] a total of [redacted]

[redacted] lines were found by the telephone company to appear on the premises of six friendly foreign government establishments. These 16 lines are as follows:

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holleman _____
Gandy _____

62-97308

NOTE: See cover memo 8-30-55, Mr. Millen to Mr. Parsons, JMH:KMB.

JMH:KMB
(?)

1- Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

b7D

<u>No. of Lines</u>	<u>Government Department</u>	<u>Embassy Where Lines Appear</u>

In my memorandum of May 13, 1955, to Deputy Attorney General Rogers it was suggested that he might wish to refer to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) the question of possible similar appearance of U. S. Government lines in foreign establishments in cities other than Washington. Mr. Rogers advised me by memorandum of June 13, 1955, that this matter had been taken up with ICIS which would subsequently follow the matter with General Services Administration. ICIS will also determine what Government buildings are not under General Services jurisdiction. I also informed Mr. Rogers of the appearance of U. S. Government lines in six friendly foreign government establishments by memorandum dated August 8, 1955.

Mr. Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, has been advised of the results of this survey by letters dated May 6, 1955, and August 8, 1955.

We have been advised by the local telephone company that its present policy is to remove the existing extra connections of U. S. Government telephone lines from foreign government premises. This matter will be followed with the telephone company to insure removal of the above-listed lines.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

FROM : R. L. Millen

DATE: Aug. 2, 1955

JUNE

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST
EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Bufile 62-97308)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____
Kefauver

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated 5-26-55 advising that telephone company was making survey of diplomatic establishments of foreign governments to determine whether branch connections of U. S. Government telephone lines appear in any of these establishments. It was also to be determined whether branch connections of [redacted] government appeared in establishments of other [redacted] governments.

Survey now completed by [redacted] Laboratory's telephone company contact, indicates 4,362 lines serving telephone, teletype, radio and other communication facilities checked during survey. Tabulation of data reflects:

b6

b7C

b7D

1. Total of [redacted] branches of U. S. and District of Columbia Government lines appear in [redacted] friendly government establishments as follows:

No. of Lines	Government Department	Embassy Where Line Appears
[redacted]		

2. Branches of [redacted] in diplomatic establishments of other [redacted] governments appear governments.

3. Branches of telephone lines of [redacted] individuals and commercial companies also appear in premises of [redacted] diplomatic establishments.

Enclosures sent 8-8-55
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Roach

SENT DIRECTOR
8-8-55

EX-104
RECORDED-991

62-97308-80

10 SEP 21 1955

JMM:KMB
(?)

11/11
5-A!

Memorandum to Mr. Parsons

The telephone company contact has advised that telephone company has no program for the elimination of these branches and does not contemplate such program because of tremendous cost involved and the destruction of their system flexibility. Telephone company will eliminate branches on any highly sensitive lines if specifically requested to do so.

It is noted that telephone company has already completed program of eliminating all telephone lines from the Communist-dominated diplomatic establishments except those serving the respective diplomatic establishments, at cost estimated by Hampton in excess of \$5000.

This survey was initiated at the Bureau's request following receipt of information set forth in memorandum of R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont 3-24-55 re [redacted] Internal Security - [redacted]

ACTION:

Attached hereto, for approval, are communications to Mr. William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, and to Mr. Dillon Anderson advising them of the results of the survey of telephone facilities in diplomatic establishments of Communist and non-Communist governments in Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C
b7D

Jew *D* *RP*
H *JW*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 09-03-2010

September 15, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Dillon Anderson
Special Assistant to the President
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Anderson:

You were advised in my letter of August 1, 1955, that as a result of a survey of the telephone facilities of [redacted] foreign diplomatic establishments it was learned that U. S. Government and 3 District of Columbia Government lines appeared on the premises of 6 of these establishments. At the time, the telephone company stated it would not eliminate the occurrences of any of these 16 lines unless specifically requested to do so.

b7D

Subsequently, the telephone company policy with regard to elimination of such lines was changed. Accordingly, the company proceeded to work on the elimination of the [redacted] lines mentioned above and reported on September 12, 1955, that these lines no longer appear on the premises of foreign establishments.

The reported action on the part of the telephone company completes this phase of the problem. In the event anything further develops I will keep you advised.

Sincerely yours,

RECEIVED - 3:33 PM '55
F. B. I.
FBI WASH. D. C.

NOTE: See cover memo Mr. Millen to Mr. Parsons, 9-14-55,
JMM:KMB. RECORDED 6 44-59318-81

1 - Mr. Roach (Liaison) (attached to copy of cover memo)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson

RLM:JMM/kmb
(9)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 SEP 27 1955 P.M.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Habro _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-03-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

FROM : R. L. Millen *RLM*

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF TELEPHONE LINES
OF COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST
EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Bufile 62-97308)

DATE: Sept. 14, 1955

14 SEP

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Michals	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Re my memorandum to you of 8-2-55 setting forth data of completed security survey of [redacted] diplomatic establishments in Washington which reflected telephone company listed [redacted] U. S. Government and [redacted] District of Columbia Government lines as appearing in six of the above establishments. Referenced memorandum also covered transmittal of a letter to Mr. Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, advising him of the appearance of these [redacted] lines in [redacted] and the fact that the telephone company would eliminate the appearance of these lines only if requested to do so.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] *CD Telephone Co*
[redacted] has now advised that as of 9-12-55 the telephone company had completed the necessary work so that these [redacted] lines no longer appear in the [redacted]

*me too
W.H.
P.C.B.*

ACTION:

Attached hereto for approval is a letter to Mr. Dillon Anderson, advising him that the telephone company has eliminated the appearance of all of the [redacted] U. S. and District of Columbia Government lines from the premises of foreign establishments.

Enclosure *2-16-55*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Whitson
- 1 - Mr. Roach

RECORDED - 77

INDEXED - 77

62-97308-82

1 SEP 27 1955

C. Edwards

6 OCT 3 1955 *lw*

JMM:KMB
(7) *lw*

*1-28
OK*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

FROM : R. L. Miller

SUBJECT: *2000*

DATE: Nov. 21, 1955

JUNE

Assy

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CHECK OF HOME TELEPHONES
 JOHN B. HOLLISTER, DIRECTOR; Services
 DeWITT SAGE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

R.H.D.C.

Reference is made to November 14, 1955, memorandum from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont in which is set out a request by [redacted] of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) for a security check of the home telephone lines of Mr. Hollister, Director of ICA, who resides at [redacted] and Mr. DeWitt Sage, Deputy Director of ICA, who resides at [redacted]

b6
b7C

Special Agent G. W. Mayo and [redacted] conducted a security survey of all telephones appearing in both residences. No evidence of tampering was observed on any of these lines. At the time that Mr. Mayo and [redacted] made their check at Hollister's residence there was no White House phone present.

Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section was telephonically advised of the completion of the security check.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information only. Liaison has advised ICA that results were negative.

I - Mr. Belmont
 I - Mr. Roach

62-97308

WGS:KMB
 (6)

1600ED-77, 62-97308-1, 83
 1600ED-77
 16 NOV 30 1955

59 DEC 12 1955

16 NOV 30 1955

The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Assistant Director Parsons
J. Walter Templey, Justice Representative
on ICIS

**Security Survey of Telephone Lines of
Communist and Non-Communist Embassies
in Washington, D. C. (Re TIC Problem 22)**

Pursuant to the suggestion contained in your memorandum of May 13, 1955, to the Deputy Attorney General, the captioned matter was referred to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security for the purpose of examining the problem and taking any necessary action.

As a result that Committee requested the General Services Administration to determine the extent to which this problem exists in United States cities other than Washington, D. C., and whether any problem may exist in connection with Government offices which are not serviced by that agency.

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a reply to that letter received from the Office of Defense Mobilization, dated October 17, 1955.

Enclosure to 15928

6 DEC 14 1955 4

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *11-25-55*
 FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *3*

DATE: November 14, 1955

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SECURITY CHECK OF HOME TELEPHONES Services?
 JOHN B. HOLLISTER, DIRECTOR;
 DeWITT SAGE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

On the morning of 11-14-55 [] of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) called Liaison Agent [] and asked if it would be possible for the Bureau to make a security check of the home telephones of Mr. John B. Hollister, Director, and DeWitt Sage, Deputy Director. ICA. [] stated that Mr. Hollister resides at [] [] Mr. Hollister has two extensions on this telephone as well as a direct White House line. Mr. Sage resides at [] Mr. Sage has a downstairs extension on this telephone.

b6
b7C

[] advised if the Bureau could make these checks and would let him know beforehand, he would make the arrangements for the Bureau to get into the homes.

ACTION:

It is recommended that the Laboratory Division make the security checks of the telephones of []

CWB:fjb
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Matter
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bates

RECORDED - 66

62-97308-84

RE NOV 30 1955

Residence + Central office
 Completed 11/17/55 by 2nd
 telephone. REC

NOV 20 1955

RECEIVED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons (JW)

FROM : R. L. Millen (JW)

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE-TELEPHONE
SECURITY SURVEY EQUIPMENT
WESTERN ELECTRIC 91A TEST SET

DATE: 11-28-55

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Comparative tests between a Western Electric 91A Test Set (147B amplifier, 723A earpiece and 513A tool) and the Bureau's Security Kit were made by SA [redacted] to determine whether the 91A set is more effective than the Security Kit for Bureau purposes. The following results were obtained.

b7E

Recommendation:

RECORDED - 78

62-97308- 85
62-97308- 11
P
EX C 11/27 1955

1 NOV 29 1955

62-97308
 cc - 62-29185 (Sound Recording & Detecting)
 JMM:ctw
 (5) ttw-
 27/11/55 DEC 2 1955

INDEXED. COPY FILED IN 62-97308-11
UNINDEXED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons *D*

FROM : R. L. Millen *PLM*

SUBJECT: *SECURITY CHECK*
PRIVATE TELEPHONES OF BUREAU OFFICIALS

DATE: Dec. 21, 1955

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

On November 28 and 29, 1955, the appearances of telephone lines utilized by Bureau officials and members of the Executives Conference were checked at the central offices of the phone company involved and between the central offices and the residences of the officials. In addition, on December 20, 1955, telephone equipment in the residence of Assistant Director Mason was checked. The above checks were made by SA George W. Mayo, Jr. and [redacted] No irregularities or evidence of tampering was found.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information.

b6
b7CGWM:KMB
(4)

DRAFT BY R. L. M.

REC'D DEC. 29
INDEXED - 97

REG. NO. 97308-86

1955

52 DEC 29 1955

ICIS-22/53

December 12, 1955

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-26-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Dear Mr. Hoover:

O Reference is made to previous correspondence regarding the security survey of telephone lines of Communist and non-Communist embassies in Washington, D. C. (memo and memorandum dated May 6, 1955 from the FBI to the Attorney General; memorandum dated May 12, 1955 from the FBI to the Deputy Attorney General; memorandum dated June 13, 1955 from the Deputy Attorney General to the FBI). As a result of consideration of this matter the ICIS wrote to the Administrator, General Services Administration, on September 28, 1955, requesting that it be advised as to the extent to which the problem exists in United States cities other than Washington, D. C., and as to any problem which may exist in connection with Government offices which are not serviced by GSA.

I wish to advise you that Mr. Leonard Felisio, Deputy Director of the Investigations Division, GSA, informed me on November 29, 1955, that the Public Building Service of that agency is to make the survey requested on a national basis and that when the survey is completed the ICIS will be advised of the results.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Tamm
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

162-97308-
62-90988 (11-19-52)

162-97308-
(11-19-52)
170-100-100-100

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons *P*

FROM : R. L. Millen *RLM*

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEYS
LAND LINE COMMUNICATIONS
MIDLAND - SOWEGO, BUREAU - QUANTICO

DATE: Feb. 23, 1956

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Beardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

On January 23 and February 6 and 7, 1956, SA [redacted]
 and [redacted] made a survey of the land line

b6

b7C

b7E

The fact that some service is routed through the Washington area is well known to the Records and Communications Division in that at the time the original installations were made the telephone company had no alternate routing available except at exorbitant costs. It is understood that the telephone company will discuss alternate routing with personnel of the Records and Communications Division just as soon as other possibilities in this area open up. The attached technical information would be of assistance in discussing any proposed changes voiced by the telephone company at a later date.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Accordingly, it is recommended that

1. This memorandum be reviewed by the Records and Communications Division and a copy retained for assistance in further discussions with telephone company personnel.

2. No further security checks of these lines be scheduled unless there are changes due to the nature of the material which was transmitted over them and the relative security against tapping.

ENCLOSURE
Enclosure 4

1 - Mr. McGuire

RLM:CKG/kmb
(5)

Age *OK* *REC'D* INDEXED - 4

3/30

JFZ

62-27308-87
6 FEB 29 1956

SEARCHED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-03-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: *March 5, 1956*

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE SECURITY SURVEY

Security of Telephone Service

On February 29 and March 1, 1956, SA [redacted] and

[redacted] conducted a security survey of the telephone facilities of all members of the Executives Conference and the Director between their residences and the central offices. No evidence of tampering on any of these lines was discovered. b

b6
b7c

In addition to the above, since you had advised that the telephone service supplied to you had been changed since the previous check, the central office records and equipment with respect to your line were examined and found in order.

During the course of this check it was discovered that the telephone lines and service as well as the telephone number of [REDACTED] had been completely altered by the telephone company on 1-24-56 due to completion of a new telephone exchange at Annandale. In the case of [REDACTED] the equipment and records of the new central office at [REDACTED] were checked in addition to all physical appearances of his telephone line. Had this change been known, an earlier security check could have been conducted.

ACTION:

Above is for information and record.

62-97308

RECORDED - 22

RLM:GWM/kmb
(4)

62-47308 - 88

8 MAR 7 1956

5-2 MAR 15 1956

PERS. FILES

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 9, 1956

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK OF WHITE HOUSE AREA
OCCUPIED BY STAFF OF GOVERNOR HAROLD STASSEN

JUNE

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SECURITY OF TELEPHONE SERVICES

Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President, contacted Philcox of Liaison 3/9/56. He stated that there is particularly sensitive work going on in some of the rooms occupied by the staff of Governor Harold Stassen, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament. He asked if it would be possible for the Bureau to make a security check of these rooms to insure that there are no microphones or other listening devices hidden. He stated that this would include Stassen's office, a conference room, and possibly several other rooms. He stated that similar sensitive work is being carried on by [redacted]

b6
b7C

who recently replaced Nelson Rockefeller. He said no request has been received from [redacted] office but it is possible that such a request could be received in the future.

Colonel Goodpaster asked if the Bureau can make such a security check and if so, what arrangements are necessary to have it done. This was discussed with Assistant Director D. J. Parsons of the Laboratory, who stated that the Bureau is equipped to conduct such a survey and that we are in a position to handle this for the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Liaison advise Colonel Goodpaster that the Bureau is in a position to handle this request for the White House and that the Laboratory will work out the necessary details with representatives of Governor Stassen's office.

RECORDED-9

NWP:lw
(8)
1-Boardman 1-Holloman
1-Belmont 1-Bartlett
1-Philcox 1-DJ Parsons
1-Section Tickler

6 APR 1956 3/20/56
R.P.C.W. NR

Liaison
R.P.C.W.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: 3-20-56

FROM : R. L. Millen

JUNE

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK OF WHITE HOUSE AREA
OCCUPIED BY STAFF OF GOVERNOR HAROLD STASSEN

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Security of Telephone Service

Special Agents [redacted] and Robert F. Pfafman, with [redacted] all of the Electronics Section, conducted a security check on Saturday, March 17, 1956, of the area occupied by Governor Harold Stassen in the White House Executive Office Building, formerly the old State Department Building.

b6

[redacted] Special Projects Group, met [redacted] b7C the Bureau representatives at the Guard's Office on the above date and procured the necessary keys and ladders.

The conference and chart room, Room 272½; the office of Governor Harold Stassen, Room 275A; the office of Ambassador Amos J. Peaslee, [redacted] were the four rooms covered by the microphone security survey. Pursuant with instructions relayed by Liaison, nothing was done during the search that would damage the premises.

Everything was found in satisfactory condition, with no indication of tampering or microphone coverage.

ACTION:

Liaison should advise Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President, that the security check requested by him for Governor Stassen was made on the morning of March 17, 1956, and conditions found satisfactory, with no evidence of tampering.

3-22-56 C.I. GOODPASTER

ADVISED.

Noted - 3-22-56
RFP:ctwRFP:ctw
(4) ctw

RECORDED-91

62-97308-90

6 APR 2 1956

1
LIAISON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 23, 1956

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
FROM BUREAU BY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF
STAFF, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Security of Telephone Service

By memorandum dated April 20, 1956, from Mr. Millen to Mr. Parsons in captioned matter, it was recorded that two Counter Intelligence Corps representatives had discussed with Bureau representatives the general procedures and equipment associated with searching a room for clandestine listening devices.

On April 20, 1956, Wendell Merrill, Chief, Operations Branch, Special Operations Section, ACSI, advised SA [redacted] Liaison Section, that he wished, through Liaison, to extend his personal thanks to the Bureau and the Bureau's representatives who handled this matter. He stated that the briefing given the CIC representatives attached to his unit was most beneficial and would be of great assistance to them in any future operation. He thanked [redacted] heartedly for the cooperation extended to ACSI by the Bureau in this matter.

b6
b7C

ACTION:

For the information of the Laboratory.

DJS:jlf

(6)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Swartz
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - [redacted]

✓ 59 MAY 1 1956

RECORDED - 83
INDEXED - 83
EX-108

62-97308-91

20 APR 25 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons *D*

FROM : R. L. Millen *Rem*

D.

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
FROM BUREAU BY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF
STAFF, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY

DATE: 4-20-56

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont *b* _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Security of Telephone Service

In accordance with the approved recommendation in the March 30, 1956, memorandum from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont, Messrs. [] and [] of the Electronics Section on 4-17-56 discussed the general procedures and equipment associated with searching a room for clandestine listening devices.

The CIC representatives were [] and [] who stated that they appreciated the opportunity to discuss the matter with Bureau representatives and that the discussion had been of considerable assistance to them.

b6
b7CACTION:

This memorandum is submitted for your information and for record purposes.

memorandum dated 4-20-56
Belmont file
4-20-56 EJW/HF

RWS:ctw
(4) ctw

RECORDED - 83

62-97308-92

20 APR 25 1956

59 MAY 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 30, 1956

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
FROM BUREAU BY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF
STAFF, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY

SA
A.C.H.

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Security of Telephone Service

On March 28, 1956, Colonel M. A. Quinto, Chief, Security Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, (ACSI), Department of the Army, advised SA D. J. Sullivan, Liaison Section, that the Chief of Staff of the Army had put a requirement on ACSI to check certain offices and conference rooms in the Pentagon in an effort to ascertain if they were secure from clandestine listening devices. Colonel Quinto stated that he has been requested by Major General Gaither, ACSI, to ascertain if the Bureau might be able to help ACSI in this matter. Colonel Quinto stated that the Counter Intelligence Corps had certain detection equipment for "sweeping" but that both he and General Gaither were of the opinion that the Bureau would be much more efficient and would no doubt have better techniques than the CIC agents.

Colonel Quinto stated that he was not requesting that the Bureau do the actual physical "sweeping" in this instance, but was requesting that if at all possible the Bureau allow personnel of the CIC to be briefed by Bureau technicians as to methods and procedures of such an operation and to give the CIC personnel the benefit of any experiences that the Bureau might have in such matters.

This question has been discussed with the Bureau Laboratory and it is thought that the Bureau could be of material assistance to ACSI concerning Colonel Quinto's request.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That Colonel Quinto be advised that the Bureau will brief designated CIC personnel in methods, procedures and techniques used in a "sweeping" operation.

RECORDED - 83

62-97308-93

20 APR 23 1956

DJS:jlf (6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. R. L. Millen
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

EX-108

WED 30 MAR 1956, 2nd ex-6 page

Memorandum
59 MAY 1 1956 to Parsons
4/20/56 RWS:ZTW

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

2. If the above recommendation is approved, arrangements will be made through Liaison with Colonel Quinto.

Col Quinto 4-3-67
Liaison J. A. B.
J. A. B.
OK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons *R*

FROM : R. L. Millen *RCM*

DATE: 6-18-56

SUBJECT: SECURITY DISCUSSION WITH
MAJOR WILLIAM MANN,
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS,
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

JUNE

Mo

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SYNOPSIS:

Major Mann called at the Laboratory to discuss security precautions to be taken by U. S. Air Force officers during their visit to the air show at Moscow, U. S. S. R., on July 24. Mann indicated that he was responsible for briefing this group of 14 officers for 20 minutes on the subject of security prior to their departure from the United States.

Special Agent [redacted] advised Mann that the Bureau could not presume to indicate to the Air Force how their officers should conduct themselves from the standpoint of security during their forthcoming visit to Moscow but that he, [redacted] would be glad to answer specific questions. Mann inquired about microphones in general, about the use of surreptitious photography, the use of closed TV circuits, the use of miniature transmitters, the possible destruction of film, and the possible use of drugs in order to secure information from the officers during their stay in Moscow. [redacted] explained that microphone development was such that effective coverage could be had with units ranging in size from the size of a dime to those 6 feet in diameter utilizing a parabolic reflector. As to photography, [redacted] indicated it was possible to secure good photographs from concealed positions with either still or movie cameras and that concealment of a TV camera was not beyond possibility. It was pointed out that with the development of transistors, transmitters had been reduced to a size even smaller than a cigarette package and that small amplifiers were available on the market no larger than a cigarette lighter.

As to the destruction of the film, it was pointed out that the use of X-ray or radio-active material could very well be employed to damage new or exposed film without the user being aware of such destruction. [redacted] indicated that the use of drugs was more or less a medical question which should be discussed by the Air Force with qualified persons.

62-97308
JMM:ctw
(4) *ctw*

7mm

RECORDED - 88

62-11717-94

E2 11717-94

INDEXED - 88

MAISON

7
S. 237

6 JUN 28 1956

Memorandum to Mr. Parsons from R. L. Millen

b6
b7C

[redacted] indicated that there would be no security survey of quarters to be occupied by the officers and asked whether or not there was any simple equipment which could be used by non-technically trained high-ranking officers which could protect them. He was told that the process of making a security survey was a time-consuming one and that persons who were to gain any benefit from the detecting equipment usually had to be trained over a considerable period of time.

It was apparent that Mann was concerned about his responsibility in briefing these high-ranking Air Force officers and was attempting to secure specific information as to what to advise them.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information only.

*fm ✓ ✓
ff*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Boardman

DATE: June 22, 1956

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR CHECK FOR LISTENING
DEVICES IN CAPITOL

Security of Telephone Services

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizemore
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

[Handwritten signatures and initials over the list]

[redacted] of Senator Green's office called this morning. Senator Green (D - Rhode Island) is Chairman of the Rules Committee of the Senate and I understand will also succeed Senator George as Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee.

Herbert [redacted] states that in the Congressional Record this morning Senator Douglas on page 9681 refers to a wiretap in the office of the Senator from New York, meaning Senator Lehman. This matter was recently publicized. [redacted] understood that Senator Douglas was directing a letter to Senator Green requesting that the entire Senate building be checked and [redacted] was wondering who would do such a thing, whether the FBI could be of assistance. He did not want any answer except to know in what direction he should go inasmuch as he had to get in touch with Senator Green this morning, who is in Rhode Island.

b6
b7CACTION TO BE TAKEN:

[redacted] wanted to know if the FBI could be of assistance.

We obviously cannot tell the Senator's office that this is a matter that ought to be handled by some commercial contractor, and it would appear that a request will be directed to the FBI just as soon as the Congressional Record statement is digested.

b6
b7C

Under the circumstances it might be well to advise Senator Green's office that we, of course, do not know the extent of the specific request and that it will probably be well to discuss the matter with Senator Green or Senator Douglas to determine whether he had any specific areas in mind which have been subjected to installation of any listening devices. Obviously to cover the entire Capitol would be a tremendous job and would give no assurance to the persons on the Hill that once the building was checked a listening device could be installed immediately after the check was made. I told [redacted] I would submit his request for appropriate consideration.

AR:jh

(6)

cc: Mr. Parsons



Memorandum to Mr. Boardman

ADDENDUM (6/22/56):

I think we should stay out of this. I suggest we tell [redacted] that he might want to have the Capitol Police arrange with the telephone company to check for any possible wire taps. The telephone company does make a check for wire taps, upon request, and this would seem to be a normal procedure to follow.

A. H. BELMONT

*D agree
6-22*

V. P. G.

*D agree
MM*

b6
b7C

*Yes.
X*

[redacted] was advised
to come and will
handle. 6-25-56 R

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson
FROM : L. B. Nichols
SUBJECT: O

DATE: 6/25/56

In view of the hullabaloo that was raised on Capitol Hill on 6/21/56, with regard to the search of Senator Lehman's office by the Defense Establishment for recording devices, I think that we should in the future decline to make any security checks unless it comes from sources wherein we could not avoid it. I think, for example, that if the Appropriations Committee, the Judiciary Committee or the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy should make inquiry of us there would be little we could do but accede. Other than these, I think we should decline all such requests.

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont

LBN:fc (4)

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Talbott _____

We will have to carefully evaluate all requests.

RECORDED - 82

EX-10

62-99308-96

JUL 3 1966

ADD 1 WIRE TAPE

SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER LYNDON B. JOHNSON CONDEMNED AS "OUTRAGEOUS" THE SEARCH OF LEHMAN'S OFFICE BY TWO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SECURITY OFFICER LEHMAN HIMSELF TERMED THE INCIDENT "INECUSABLE, OUTRAGEOUS AND HIGHLY DANGEROUS."

LEHMAN TOOK TO THE SENATE FLOOR ON A POINT OF "PERSONAL PRIVILEGE" TO TELL THE SENATE HOW YESTERDAY TWO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SECURITY OFFICERS, ACCCOMPANIED BY A CAPITOL POLICEMAN, "BARGED" INTO HIS OFFICE AND SEARCHED THROUGH ONE OF HIS ROOMS.

THE TWO SECURITY OFFICERS -- CLARK M. MORGAN AND BERNARD S. BOGDONOWICZ -- SAID THEY HAD NOTICED SOME LOOSE INSULATION AROUND A VENTILATOR IN THE HEARING ROOM AND TRACED THE VENTILATOR BACK TO LEHMAN'S OFFICE. THEY SAID THEY LEFT THE SENATOR'S ROOM -- A STORE-ROOM IN A SUITE OF OFFICES -- AFTER CHECKING FOR CONCEALED LISTENING DEVICES AND FINDING NONE.

SYMINGTON EXPRESSED TO LEHMAN ON THE SENATE FLOOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S "VERY DEEP APOLOGIES."

SYMINGTON SAID IT WAS "ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF BUREAUACY AND OVER-EAGER FLATFOOTED INDIVIDUALS."

AFTER LISTENING TO THE EXPLANATION BY THE TWO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS, SEN. LEVERETT SALTONSTALL (R-MASS.) COMMENTED THAT THE INCIDENT HAD BEEN "MAGNIFIED" OUT OF PROPORTION AND THAT THE TWO MEN WERE ONLY CARRYING OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO BE SURE THAT THE SECRET HEARINGS WERE NOT BEING "BUGGED."

ON THE SENATE FLOOR, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT BY JOHNSON TO PLAY DOWN THE INCIDENT. JOHNSON SAID HE WAS "AMAZED AND SHOCKED" TO HEAR OF THE "OUTRAGEOUS TREATMENT" ACCORDED LEHMAN AND SAID LEHMAN IS "DESERVING OF AN APOLOGY" FROM THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT.

DESCRIBING THE SEARCH AS "TYPICAL BUREAUCRATIC CLATFOOT STUPIDITY," JOHNSON SAID THAT IT WAS WITH "UTTER DISGUST" AND "UTTER HORROR" THAT HE LEARNED THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT WAS PERMITTING ITS CIVILIAN SECURITY OFFICERS TO "RAMSACK" THE OFFICES OF THE SENATE.

"I HOPE EVERY MEMBER OF THIS BODY WILL DENOUNCE THIS INADVISABLE ACTION," JOHNSON TOLD THE SENATE.

6/21/56 TS217P

ADD 2 WIRETAP

JOHNSON SAID HE HAS CALLED FOR A COMPLETE REPORT ON THE INCIDENT BY THE CAPITOL POLICE.

LEHMAN TOLD THE SENATE THAT THE INCIDENT "AFFECTS THE DIGNITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE SENATE."

LEHMAN SAID THE TWO DEFENSE OFFICERS HAD "BARGED" INTO HIS OFFICE, "BRUSHED MY SECRETARY ASIDE" AND SAID THEY WISHED TO INSPECT A CERTAIN PART OF HIS OFFICE. THE MEN, HE SAID, DID NOT SHOW THEIR CREDENTIALS UNTIL IT WAS DEMANDED BY THE SECRETARY -- MRS. MILDRED AKINS -- AND DID NOT ASK HIS PERMISSION TO SEARCH HIS OFFICES.

LEHMAN DEMANDED TO KNOW WHO IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT "DIRECTED THIS INSPECTION" AND "WHO ON MY STAFF WAS UNDER SUSPICION."

MORGAN HAD TOLD THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT THE SECURITY MONITORING OF THE HEARINGS HAD BEEN ORDERED BY THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S LEGISLATIVE LIAISON OFFICE THROUGH THE SECURITY SERVICES DIVISION.

MORGAN SAID THAT MRS. AKINS AT FIRST SEEMED "LEARY" OF ALLOWING THEM INTO THE OFFICE, BUT AFTER BEING SHOWN THE IDENTIFICATION SEEMED "VERY CONTENTED" TO HAVE THE INSPECTION MADE.

THE FLOOR CONTROVERSY BROUGHT CRITICISM OF THE INVASION OF LEHMAN'S OFFICE AND SUGGESTIONS THAT SOME QUALIFIED GROUP MAKE A THOROUGH SECURITY CHECK OF THE SENATE'S QUARTERS.

SEN. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY (D-MINN.) SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO FIND OUT WHETHER WALLS ARE "BUGGED." "I'D LIKE TO FIND OUT HOW MANY TELEPHONES ARE TAPPED, IF ANY ARE. I KEEP HEARING THEY ARE," HE SAID.

SEN. PAUL H. DOUGLAS (D-ILL.) SUGGESTED THAT THE SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, WHICH HANDLES SENATE HOUSEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS, CONDUCT AN INSPECTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER TELEPHONES ARE TAPPED OR OFFICES AND COMMITTEE ROOMS BUGGED.

6/21/56 TS229P

ENW

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. MOHR ✓
FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

DATE: January 10, 1957

SUBJECT:

Security of Telecommunications Service

While discussing other matters with [redacted] of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations which handles our appropriation hearings, this afternoon, he inquired as to whether or not the Bureau cared to make a technical security survey of the hearing room in which the Director will testify such as has been done in past years.

I inquired of [redacted] if he felt such a survey was necessary or desirable and he indicated that it was up to us as to whether or not we would want to make such a survey.

Last year the Director approved us making a detailed survey of this hearing room which included ceiling and wall screening for hidden devices. Since there has been no alteration to these areas this year, a similar survey would not appear necessary; however, I do feel as a precautionary measure favorable consideration should be given to running a cursory technical survey of the obvious points in the room such as telephone instruments, wall outlets and the like.

b6
b7C

[redacted] indicated that the best time for such a survey, if desired, would be Friday, January 11, 1957, inasmuch as the Subcommittee was commencing hearings Monday, January 14, 1957.

If approved appropriate arrangements will be made with the Laboratory and the writer will accompany the men assigned to this survey in connection therewith.

cc: Mr. Parsons

NPC:eam
(3)

RECORDED-42

EX-172

64-97388-97

1 MARCH 1957

SEVEN
1/11/57

52 JAN 18 1957

memo to Parsons
1/11/57

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Parsons

DATE: January 8, 1957

FROM : R. L. Miller

SUBJECT: SENATOR THEODORE GREEN
(RHODE ISLAND - D)

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen ✓
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. Rosen to Mr. Boardman dated 12-11-56, relative to the above matter. Pursuant with the appointment made by Mr. Rosen with [redacted] of Senator Green's office SA [redacted] conferred with [redacted] at 11:30 a.m. on 1-4-57, at the Senator's office, Room 221 Senate Office Building.

[redacted] indicated that a telephone security check was desired of the Senator's apartment in the University Club Building at 1135 16th Street, N.W., to determine the vulnerability of said lines.

Agent Pfafman advised [redacted] that several days would be required to make arrangements with the telephone company for access to their cable books and blueprints but that everything should be ready by Wednesday morning 1-9-57. However, [redacted] indicated that he would be out of town on 1-9-57, as well as 1-10-57. Accordingly, a tentative schedule was set up for Bureau Agent to meet [redacted] at the Senator's apartment on Friday, 1-11-57, at 1:00 p.m. Agent [redacted] is to call [redacted] office early Friday morning to ascertain his return to Washington as the latter wishes to be at the apartment in person.

b6
b7CRECOMMENDATION:

This is for information only. The survey will be made at the time indicated.

162-97308-1
NOT RECORDED
176 JAN 17 1957

RFP:ART

4

M JAN 15 1957

SEVERED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: 12/11/56

FROM : A. ROSEN

SUBJECT: SENATOR THEODORE GREEN
(RHODE ISLAND - D.)

Security of Telephone Services

I ran into [redacted] of Senator Green's office. He advised me that yesterday the Senator mentioned his concern over the possibility of his telephone conversations being covered by unauthorized persons.

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Nease _____
Tele. Room -
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

The Senator resides at the University Club. He has an apartment on the 4th floor, front corner, which is immediately next to the area which divides the University Club from the immediate building to the south on the 16th Street side, which is the Russian Embassy.

b6
b7C

The Senator is going to be the Chairman of the most important committee of the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee. The State Department has asked that he establish a private telephone line so that he might be able to receive urgent telephone calls on important matters of state. At the present time he receives all of his telephone calls through the University Club switchboard. The Senator asked [redacted] if it was possible for the Russians to monitor his conversations in any manner and wondered whether he ought to take any steps to move from his present location. The Senator stated that he would not like to make any changes as he has lived there a long time and likes "the setup."

[redacted] was inquiring on behalf of the Senator as to whether any further steps should be taken and whether he should evidence any concern over the matter. He did not want to do anything which would allow unauthorized persons to listen in on conversations or otherwise monitor conversations taking place in the Senator's quarters, and he also did not want to alarm the Senator who at this point indicated he was most cautious in his manner of conversation over the phone but that he could not vouch for persons who might be calling him. He was concerned lest anyone calling the Senator might in an unguarded statement disclose important information to persons who are not entitled to receive it. The question of whether a separate line is to be put in has not been answered. The security of the telephone calls coming through the switchboard is, under the present arrangement, very doubtful.

162-77305-1
NOT RECOMMENDED

176 JAN 18 1957

cc - Mr. Parsons

176 JAN 17 1957 SP

Memo to Mr. Boardman

In view of the importance of the Senator's position as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the fact that numerous telephone calls will probably be coming to his quarters and the possibility it is not unlikely that calls may emanate from the White House to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, it might be well to have a check made of his lines. It would appear that from the Bureau's standpoint it would be advisable to make such a check and also be aware of the Senator's setup in the event any changes in his communication's arrangements are effected.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested that we make a preliminary check of the Senator's lines to determine whether any effort has been made to monitor his conversations in his present quarters. I have talked to Mr. Parsons and he has indicated this could be done with little difficulty at this time.

PMW

ABR

DR ✓

Handled

GKJ

Office Mem

vm • UNITED S

OVR. IN MEDI

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: August 28, 1956

FROM : R. L. Miller RUMP

SUBJECT:

Tel _____
 Nic _____
 Beerman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamai _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Re: [REDACTED]

Memorandum to A. H. Belmont from R. R. Roach dated 8-23-56 concerning above individual sets forth approval for [REDACTED] to visit the FBI on 8-27-56 for a conference concerning microphone surveillances and countertechnical equipment.

[REDACTED] talked to [REDACTED] of the Electronics Section of the Laboratory on that date concerning technical surveillances, microphone surveillances, mobile radio equipment and security checks. No highly classified Bureau equipment or techniques were discussed with him.

ACTION:

b6
b7C
b7D

R. R. Roach
B. L. Miller
B. L. Miller

None. For information only.

NOT RECORDED
199 SEP 20 1956

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - [REDACTED] Room 7647

62-92325-100-1

JMW:ctw
(6) CTW

RECORDED-57
INDEXED-57

EX-110

62-74-19-113

16 SEP 1956

71 SEP 20 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons
FROM : R. L. Millen *DM*

DATE: January 14, 1957

JUNE

SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY, ROOM B25
U. S. CAPITOL BUILDING
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____

Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

C. G. Callahan to Mr. Mohr
The memorandum from Mr. Callahan to Mr. Mohr dated 1-10-57 set forth a request made by [redacted] of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, for a technical security survey of the hearing room in which the Director will testify.

SA's G. W. Mayo and [redacted] conducted a check for concealed microphones on January 11, 1957, in Room B25, U. S. Capitol Building. At the request of [redacted] this check was limited to a search in places most likely for microphone concealment. No evidence reflecting concealed listening devices was discovered.

b6
b7C

ACTION:

For information.

62-97308

JMM:KMB
SP-14

RECORDED-42
EX-172 *62-97308-98*
JAN 16 1957

SEVEN

52 JAN 16 1957

700174

January 28, 1957

99

RECORDED - 33

Honorable Theodore Francis Green
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.


My dear Senator:

In reference to your letter of January 18, 1957, wherein you requested a security check of the Foreign Relations Committee Room in the Capitol, I am pleased to advise that technical personnel can be made available for this purpose during the week of February 3, 1957.

Accordingly, unless advised to the contrary, FBI Laboratory personnel will be in contact with your office for the purpose of setting the most suitable time and date for the survey.

Sincerely yours,

W. E. HOLLOWAY



REM:KMB

5

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, R. I., CHAIRMAN
J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK.
JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.
WAYNE MORSE, OREG.
RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
JOHN F. KENNEDY, MASS.

ALEXANDER WILEY, WIS.
H. ALEXANDER SMITH, N. J.
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA
WILLIAM LANGER, N. DAK.
WILLIAM F. KNOWLTON, CALIF.
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
HOMER E. CAPEHART, IND.

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
C. C. O'DAY, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Mitchell _____
Mr. Harriman _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. McCall _____
Mr. Johnson _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Hartman _____
Miss Gandy _____

January 18, 1957.

Honorable John Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover :

In February of 1953 and in April of 1955
the personnel of your Bureau made a security check of the
Foreign Relations Committee Room in the Capitol.

It will be appreciated if a similar check
of the offices may be made at this time.

Thanking you for your assistance in this
matter, I am,

Security of Telephone
Services

Sincerely yours,

Theodore Francis Green
Chairman.

Theodore Francis Green

R.I.
D.C.

RECORDED - 62-97308-99

INDEXED - 33

EX-18

JAN 23 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-03-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

February 21, 1957

Honorable Theodore Francis Green
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Senator:

Reference is made to your letter of January 18, 1957, requesting a security check of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Room in the Capitol. In compliance with arrangements effected through [redacted]

[redacted] the survey was made by FBI personnel on Saturday, February 16, 1957.


A check was made of the Chief Clerk's office as well as of the Committee Room and both were found to be in order with no evidence of tampering.

It was indeed a pleasure to be of assistance to you in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J. E. [Signature]

FEB 21 1957
REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI
100



RFP:ART
5

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Addendum: Memo from Millen to Parsons dated 2-20-57
re: Security Check, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Room at U. S. Capitol.
RFP:ART

Address per our reply to Senator Green's letter of 1-18-57
dated 1-28-57.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: February 20, 1957

FROM : R. L. Millen

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ROOM AT U. S. CAPITOL

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Massey _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SA's [redacted] conducted a microphone security check of the most likely places in the hearing room of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the U. S. Capitol as well as the office of the [redacted] [redacted] immediately joining. This security check was made on Saturday morning, February 16, 1957, and the results were negative.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to Senator Theodore Francis Green, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to advise him that the security check has been made and everything was found to be in order.

RFP:ART

6C86 4

RECORDED-6

EX-117

sent 2-20-57

MWS

62-41507-101

FEB 27 1957

[Redacted]

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED

SOLOMON

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: February 18, 1957

FROM : D. J. Parsons

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK REQUESTED BY
SENATOR JOHN E. McCLELLANJUNE

Tolson
 McNally
 Boardman
 Belmont
 Mohr
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Trotter
 Nease
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Gandy

[Handwritten signature over list]

Pursuant to arrangements made by the Director, I saw Senator McClellan Saturday afternoon. He said he didn't know enough about the technical aspects to really know what he wanted until he had talked to the Director. He did now feel that he wanted the hearing room of the Committee on Government Operations checked, his office and home phones, as well as those of Committee Counsel Robert Kennedy. He asked that countermeasures be put in the Committee room phones and his home and office phones. I assured the Senator that we would be glad to do this and we would get started immediately.

I explained to the Senator that the countermeasure did not prevent a tap to overhear conversations over the telephone line but did prevent the telephone from being used as a microphone to pick up conversations in the room. He said he understood this and that frankly he was not concerned about his conversations over the phone even to the extent that when he got annoyed he told some of the people he was talking to to go ahead and record his conversations. I did tell him that we would, of course, check all of the telephone lines and determine whether there were any taps in existence or any indications that the phones had been tapped.

Messrs. [redacted] and Pfafman of the Laboratory started the check of the premises in the Senate Office Building immediately and made a search for microphones insofar as it was possible without damage to walls or fixtures. Nothing was found. Countermeasure devices were installed in the Senator's office phone, four phones in the Committee room, four in Kennedy's office. This work was completed Saturday night so that we are now through in the Senate Office Building premises. It will require two to three days more to complete the check of the telephone lines and cables but we expect to complete all of the work including the Senator's and Kennedy's home phones by Wednesday evening.

Senator McClellan also asked if we would make a recheck of whatever we thought was necessary at some reasonable period and I told him we would do this. The Senator was most appreciative and said he realized that it was desirable from our standpoint as well as his not to have this spread around and that he and Kennedy were the only ones aware of our security check and protective measures.

ACTION:

RECORDED-38

62-973-4-102

This work will be completed as soon as possible and an additional memorandum will be submitted setting forth the results.

64 MAR 14 1957

1 - Mr. Rosen, attention [redacted]

DJP:KMB 5/23

b6
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons *J*
 FROM : R. L. Millen *RM*

DATE: February 26, 1957

JUNE

SUBJECT: SECURITY CHECK REQUESTED BY
SENATOR JOHN L. McCLELLAN

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons *P* _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to your memorandum of 2-18-57 to Mr. Tolson setting forth a request by Senator John L. McClellan for installation of countermeasure devices and the making of security checks in his Committee room, office and residence, and in the office and residence of Robert F. Kennedy, Chief Counsel of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field.

On February 16, 19 and 20, 1957, SA Supervisors R. F. Pfafman and [redacted] completed all work in connection with the Senator's request. No evidence of concealed microphones or of tampering with the telephone lines was discovered.

b6
b7C

A total of six man days were required to perform the following work:
 (1) Microphone surveys of three rooms in the Senate Office Building - the Government Operations Committee room (Room 357), the Senator's office (Room 137A), and Kennedy's office (Room 103). (2) Telephone security checks of 17 lines involving 19 instruments in all of the above rooms and at the apartment of the Senator in the Fairfax Hotel, Washington, D. C., and the residence of Kennedy at McLean, Virginia. (3) The installation of 15 countermeasure devices in telephone instruments at the above locations.

The telephone security check necessitated the entering of six telephone exchanges. In the Senate Office Building the Exchange Foreman had to spend three hours with Pfafman and [redacted] so that they could enter restricted areas without question and get into locked cabinets and rooms to check terminal appearances. *llm*

In addition, the Senator has requested a check of his office in the Capitol Building. This will be done. However, the actual check will not be made until later in that the office is not currently in use. A separate report will be prepared covering the results of his office check.

62-97308

RECORDED-38

1 - Mr. Rosen, attention Mr. [redacted]
 1 - 80-760 (RFMT Units)

18 MAR 7 1957

b6
b7C

JMM:kmb/art

6
 08 MAR 20 1957
 CAF:JMM

comp # 293, 977
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 5/1/91 BY SP-5 CI/DTB

Memo R. L. Millen to Mr. Parsons
Re: Security Check Requested by
Senator John L. McClellan
62-97308

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Senator McClellan be advised of the result of the security checks made at his request.



should do this
OK PL ←
Sen for McClellan
3/15/57
advised ↗

2. In view of the amount of effort involved in making the complete check it is recommended that the FBI Laboratory perform periodic spot checks of the areas and lines in which the Senator and Mr. Kennedy are interested.

D. V. X
OK PL.

will handle
PL 3/15/57

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: March 15, 1957

FROM : R. L. Millen

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE SECURITY CHECK
EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

On March 5, 6, 8 and 13, 1957, the residential telephone lines of Mr. Hoover and members of the Executives Conference were inspected. All appearances of these lines between the residences and the central offices were examined.

No evidence of tampering or other improper activity was discovered.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information.

62-97308

GWM:KMB

4

EX-113 RECORDED - 81

RECORDED
9 MAR 20 1957

51 APR 4 1957

STEVENSON